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Procedural Design
Alexandra D. Lahav*

The procedural law dictates the sequence of steps that bring a
lawsuit from filing to completion. The design of civil procedure in the
federal courts is generally described as having the following sequential
order: complaint, motion to dismiss, discovery, summary judgment,
trial, and finally, appeal. While this is a passable description of the
vision of the drafters of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure in 1938, it
no longer describes the reality of federal litigation. Jurisdictioncan be
determined at the end of the lawsuit rather than the beginning. Judges
demand determination of factual disputes before discovery commences
through a variety of motions and orders. Hearings that are trials in all
but name are held at the commencement of litigation, even as trials are
expected to end a suit. Appeals can be brought at any time, even multiple
times in one case. This Article is the first to synthesize and explain these
developments.
For a variety of reasons explained in this Article, the federal
courts take inconsistent and often poorly justified approaches to
proceduraldesign. But a proceduralsystem ought to have an articulable
design, one that fits with the goals of that system and can be contested
based on its ability to achieve those goals. To begin the discussion of the
future of procedure, this Article suggests three possibilities: the
traditionalsequential order described above, a bespoke order in which
judges pick the most important issue in the case and adjudicate that
issue using the order of motions they think appropriate, or a subject
matter order in which procedures are standardized but tailored by case
type. Each of these procedural designs has costs and benefits when
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measured against the competing values of accuracy, relative speed of
resolution, and cost. Preferences among them are likely to depend on the
reader's assumptions about the capabilities of judges and party
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION

Sarah Palin brought a defamation suit against the New York
Times. In such a suit, the plaintiff is required to prove actual malice.
The Times moved to dismiss, and the judge ordered the writer of the
offending editorial to testify in court. The purpose of the testimony was
to determine whether the judge could permissibly infer that the author
wrote the editorial with actual malice.' But wait a minute, is this not
backwards? How can a judge transform a motion to dismiss, which is
supposed to be decided taking all the allegations as true, into a live

1.
See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 17-cv-4853 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017) (order convening
evidentiary hearing) (stating that the author's testimony was required before the court could
determine if actual malice existed).

2018]

PROCEDURAL DESIGN

823

hearing? 2 This incident is part of a larger phenomenon, the erosion of
the traditional order of procedure, and this Article explains how it came
to pass and what the federal courts should do about it.
Procedure is that aspect of the larger legal order that dictates
how a lawsuit proceeds from filing to completion. The procedural design
most often associated with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
taught in most law school classrooms can be briefly described as follows:
A complaint is filed, followed by either an answer or a motion to dismiss
(which determines ordinarily whether the court has jurisdiction and
whether the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for relief). Then, a
process of discovery allows the parties to obtain information relevant to
their claims and defenses, after which the parties will either move for
summary judgment (if there is no issue of material fact for a factfinder
to determine) or proceed to trial and judgment, followed by an appeal.
This is a simplified version, of course, but it adequately describes what
I will call "textbook" procedure because it is the way procedure is taught
at most law schools. The defining characteristics of the textbook
procedural design are that it is sequential and that the questions asked
at each stage correspond to the information the parties are expected to
have at that stage. As the litigation proceeds, especially as it proceeds
through discovery, parties are expected to have more information and
the demands for determining the merits increase.
Drawing on appellate opinions in a variety of procedural areas,
this Article demonstrates that the textbook order is not an accurate
description of civil procedure in the federal courts. 3 Today, a federal
lawsuit may proceed in almost any order. For example, although some
lip service is paid to the finality requirement before an appeal can be
filed, in fact an appeal can follow a motion to dismiss rather than await
a final judgment. Ostensibly threshold jurisdictional questions such as
standing can be decided after a jury has rendered its verdict. A motion
for summary judgment may precede the answer. A nonbinding trial on
the merits may be held at the class certification stage, before any
dispositive motions on the merits.
Although the phenomena described here may be familiar to
experienced litigators, the decline of the textbook order has not been

2.
See Nakahata v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2013)
("We do not consider matters outside the pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.").
3.
This Article does not address procedural developments in the state courts. For some
thoughts on the overlap between state and federal procedural regimes, or lack thereof, see John B.
Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 355 (2003).
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documented before. 4 The observation that our old design has been
undermined and no new design has replaced it is important because the
procedural law ought to have some articulable design. As Lon Fuller
reminds us, "Law may be said to represent order simpliciter. Good order
is law that corresponds to the demands of justice, or morality, or men's
notions of what ought to be." 5 But it is not enough that the ends of law
are good ends; it is also necessary that the means we use to achieve
those ends are good. Procedure is one such means. As Fuller explains:
"As we seek to make our order good, we can remind ourselves that
justice itself is impossible without order, and that we must not lose
order itself in the attempt to make it good."6 It is time to reconsider

what design best fits our system.
The sequential order as the default procedural design has been
eroding for about forty years.7 We do not know how pervasive the
phenomenon is, but it can affect any case. Indeed, anecdotal evidence
indicates that at least some judges do not use the textbook order of
procedure as a default in any lawsuit, regardless of subject matter or
simplicity. 8

The first question of procedural design is how much the order of
proceedings ought to be standardized. Short of the Red Queen's
command of "sentence first, verdict afterwards!"9 which clearly violates
due process, there are numerous ways to sequence litigation. I propose
three default procedural designs for consideration: the textbook order,
a bespoke order, and a subject matter order. We have already seen that
the textbook order consists of a sequence of motions tied to the
information likely to be available at each stage of the litigation. Under
4.
A few scholars have analyzed how some motions should be sequenced. See Kevin M.
Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional
Primary and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301 (2011) (analyzing modern sequencing
decisions in the context of jurisdictional determinations and judge/jury factual determinations);
Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2013) (analyzing the standards
applied at each stage in sequential litigation); Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA.
L. REV. 1 (2010) (modeling sequence of motions with a focus on international adjudication). These
scholars assume that judges have discretion to alter procedural sequencing and that this is
normatively desirable, an assumption questioned here.

5.
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 644 (1958). Thanks to Charles Barzun for pointing me to this quote.
6.
Id. at 657.
7.
As you will see below, it began between 1970 and 1980. "Crumbling is not an instant's
act/A fundamental pause/Dilapidation's processes/Are organized Decays-" EMILY DICK[NSON,
Crumbling is not an instant's Act, in THE POEMS OF EMILY DIClINSON: READING EDITION (R.W.

Franklin ed., 2005).
8.
For an example, see Procedures for Cases Assigned to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, U.S.
DISTRICT & BANKR. CT. S. DISTRICT TEX., http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/hr_16.pdf

(last visited Feb. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TV75-GQTA].
9.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
ANNOTATED ALICE 161 (Martin Gardner ed., 1960).

(1865),

reprinted in THE
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a bespoke order, by contrast, the judge isolates the dispositive issue(s)
in the individual case and tailors a sequence of motions to resolve it. A
subject matter order provides standardized sequencing rules for
different areas of the substantive law.
The most important thing about procedural design is that it
ought to be contestable. The problem diagnosed in this Article is a
failure to agree on and articulate the most basic principles of a
procedural design for the federal courts, a predicate to contesting it.
This failure has resulted in a system in which judges make inconsistent
and often unexplained procedural choices, sometimes without
understanding how these choices have negative systemic effects. The
reason contestability is crucial is that procedural design affects
litigants' ability to enforce or defend their rights. 10 The courts should be
able to explain the logic of procedural design so that people can dispute
whether that design is indeed a good one, and perhaps, through that
process of justification, a better design will emerge."
What measure should be used to pick among procedural designs?
I suggest four criteria to evaluate potential procedural designs for the
purposes of preliminary discussion: (1) whether the procedural design
provides for a meaningful hearing, (2) how likely it is to achieve an
accurate application of the law to the facts of the case, (3) the relative
speed of resolution, and (4) the cost of proceedings.1 2 The goals of the
procedural regime are disputed, and the goals I suggest are open to
multiple interpretations and may overlap or be in tension with one
another. This Article does not attempt a definitive account of what goals
a procedural system ought to have. 13 The point of the discussion is to
illustrate the application of some generally agreed upon goals to the
procedural designs I describe and, in so doing, begin the discussion.
10. "The administration of justice is a good test of civilization of the people where it exists."
Learned Hand, The Deficienciesof Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL
TOPICS, 1921-1922, at 86, 105 (James N. Rosenberg et al. eds., 1926).
11. Cf. Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in ProceduralLaw, 65 ALA. L. REV.
683 (2014) (arguing for an administrative law approach to procedural design focusing on reason
giving).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules should be interpreted "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").

13. For a general discussion of different process values, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-PartI, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153,
which discusses dignity values, participation values, deterrence values, and effectuation values.
For an example of a welfarist analysis of procedural values, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1186-1217 (2001). For an analysis of procedure
focusing on rights rather than accuracy, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103

(1985). For an analysis of procedural values that, while still instrumental, differs from the
economic analysis of the procedural law because it does not focus on accuracy of outcomes, see
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1658
(2016).
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A final and important note: the term "order" appears throughout
the Article and can have multiple meanings. 14 It can mean a sequence
of motions, one step following the other. Order can also be a methodical
or harmonious arrangement. Finally, order can mean "command" and
connote authoritarianism if it is too rigid. Each sense of the term is
relevant to this analysis. The debate over what order the procedural law
should follow-and whether the order is too rigid, too unpredictable, or
just the right balance
choes the familiar debate about rules and
standards. 15 While rules provide certainty and are easy to administer,

they can be too rigid and lead to poor results because they are under- or
overinclusive. Standards, on the other hand, may allow judges greater
flexibility to do justice in the individual case but can also be
unpredictable and costly to administer. The question for procedural
design is how best to balance flexibility and predictability so that the
procedural law is methodical and harmonious without being oppressive.
The insight that the procedural law no longer has an
overarching design may be familiar to sophisticated practitioners but is
not much addressed in procedural scholarship. It is linked to some
ongoing debates in the field, however. Many scholars have pointed out
that federal procedural law has become more restrictive, making it
especially difficult for individual litigants to obtain redress in the
courts. 16 Second, scholars have pointed out that judges have become
more involved in managing litigation,17 a phenomenon that is
correlated with (and perhaps has caused) a decline in the trial rates and
which has been ongoing for forty years or more.1 8 These two
14.

Order is not the same as uniformity. For critiques of uniformity as a value, see Amanda

Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2008); and Alexandra D. Lahav,
Recovering the Social Value of JurisdictionalRedundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2415 (2008),
which proposes a three-factor test for determining whether to permit cases about similar subject
matter to be decided by different courts.
15.

For analyses of rules versus standards, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus

&

Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, ForewordThe Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-94 (1992); and Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995). See also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
16. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 353, 356 (2010) (noting the use of judicial discretion as well as "the preference for meritsbased judgments over those obtained through procedural technicalities"); Stephen N. Subrin
Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1848-55 (2014)
(discussing heightened pleading requirements, limited discovery, increased use of summary
judgment, and other reforms negatively impacting cases in the judicial system).
17. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (criticizing
increasing judicial management); William W. Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial
Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978) (advocating judicial management).
18. See David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practiceof Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1981-84 (1989) ("The role of the judge, then, was to keep cases moving at
a reasonable pace, and to see that cases not be needlessly tried.").
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observations-restrictiveness and managerial judging-provide some
explanation for the erosion of the textbook procedural design, but this
development was not inevitable. A procedural system could be designed
to be restrictive but also orderly. The old common law writ system is an
example. Similarly, a procedural system could permit significant
judicial management but still be organized to follow a required
sequence of motions.
The Article begins with a description of the state of procedural
design in the federal courts, tracing the evolution of five key doctrines
that have eroded the textbook order. Part II is diagnostic, considering
possible reasons for the disintegration of the textbook procedural order.
Part III is normative, framing the conversation that scholars and
rulemakers ought to have going forward. The central question raised by
the disintegration of the textbook order is what procedural design ought
to replace it.19 I propose three options-a default sequential order such
as the textbook order, a bespoke order, and a substance-specific orderand analyze each one. In the end, this analysis shows that preferences
among these designs may hinge on beliefs about individual judges'
capacities (especially to exercise discretion) and predictions about party
behavior, both of which merit further study.
I. THE DOCTRINES OF DISINTEGRATION
Significant doctrinal changes over the last forty years have led
to a disintegration of federal procedural design. This Part demonstrates
that changes in five procedural doctrines upend the textbook order of
litigation: standing, motions to dismiss, class action certification,
summary judgment, and appeals. It is important to be clear from the
start that the fact that doctrines structurally permit (or in some cases
encourage) disorder does not mean that judges never follow the
textbook order. Each of the doctrines described is discretionary in its
trigger or in application. What sequence of motions judges ordinarily
follow, if indeed they follow any regular sequence, has yet to be
documented. Case filing data gives us a sense that disorder is
pervasive, 20 but the disintegration described at this stage of the
research is a structural one.
19. This can also be framed as a problem of optimal standardization of motion sequencing.
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 39-46 (2000) (discussing applications of
standardization).
20. The categories of cases especially affected by disintegration of the textbook order make
up much of the federal docket. Adding together multidistrict litigation ("MDL") and civil rights
cases (which tend not to be MDLs), this phenomenon is applicable to approximately sixty percent
of the federal docket. In 2015, approximately thirty-nine percent of the federal pending cases were
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A. Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Justiciability questions such as whether a plaintiff has standing
to sue are generally to be decided at the commencement of the
litigation. 21 Since standing concerns the power of the court to hear the
case at all, a court ought to determine whether it has the power to
decide a case as its first act. 22 But the command that standing ought to
be determined at the start of the litigation does not fit well with the
requirements of standing doctrine as they have evolved since the early
1970s. This Section first briefly describes the evolution of standing
doctrine and then explains how these developments upend the order of
the procedural law. It then compares these developments in standing
doctrine to those in subject matter jurisdiction.
Standing doctrine as it is understood today did not exist for most
of American history. 23 Between the founding era and 1920, "what we
now consider to be the question of standing was answered by deciding
whether Congress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff
a right to sue." 2 4 This approach fit well with the writ system of pleading;
MDLs, which are largely mass torts. TOMMIE DUNCAN, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,

2015 YEAR-END REPORT 1 (2016) (on file with author). About thirteen percent of new filings were
MDL cases. Id. at 2 n.4. In 2014, the total number of pending MDL cases was thirty-six percent of
the federal docket, and eighty-eight percent of these were mass tort cases. DUKE LAW CTR. FOR
JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, at x-xi (2014), https://law.duke.edul

judicialstudies/conferences/september20l4/papers/

[https://perma.cc/6TC2-QSGK]. In 2015, civil

rights cases, including prisoner cases, made up about twenty-two percent of federal filings, and

personal injury cases about twenty-five percent. Table 4.4: U.S. District Courts-CivilCases Filed,
by Nature of Suit, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datatables/Table4.04.pdf

(last visited Feb. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/72AY-VGUC].
21. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 117 (7th ed.

2015) (discussing principles underlying standing doctrine, such as "limiting the judicial process to
litigants

who

will

be

energetic

adversaries,"

which generally

assume

determination

at

commencement).
22. "Because it may affect our jurisdiction, ... we consider first the District Court's
conclusion that the severability provision of the 1977 Amendments would, if valid, deprive appellee
of standing.. . ." Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 (1984); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION

§

3531.15 n.1 (3d ed. updated

Apr. 2017) (discussing characterization of standing as a jurisdictional issue). As the authors of the
Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise explain, "[I]t is commonly said that standing must exist at the
time an action is filed. Post-filing events that supply standing that did not exist on filing may be
disregarded. . . ." 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3531 (citing Utah Ass'n of Ctys. v. Bush, 455 F.3d
1094, 1101 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2006)) (standing acquired after action is filed insufficient); see also
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149, 160-162
(2d Cir. 2012) (dismissing case when original plaintiff lacked standing although intervenor had
standing). For an argument that the standing inquiry should be abandoned entirely in favor of the
motion to dismiss (that is, "a question on the merits of [the] plaintiff's claim"), see William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988).
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentationof Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2015).
24. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992). This history is largely drawn from Sunstein's work. For a
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if a writ was recognized, then the plaintiff could bring a lawsuit. 25
Because of the rigidity of the writ system, the question was a relatively
easy one-either a writ was recognized or it was not. This is unlike the
modern pleading system, which requires a "statement of the claim" 2 6
and therefore permits greater flexibility in plaintiffs' assertions that
they have a legal claim at all.
In the 1930s, standing began to emerge as a separate set of
doctrinal concerns in response to the rise of the administrative state. In
1939, a year after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect,
the Supreme Court explained that standing to sue required that the
plaintiff have a "legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract,
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege." 27 During the period between 1930 and 1960,
in response to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the rise of
the administrative state, the Court recognized a standing doctrine
focused on the question of whether the plaintiff had a legal right,
conceptualized as a cause of action. 28 Standing emerged as a separate
legal doctrine, but the inquiry remained focused on whether the
plaintiff could assert a legal right.
Whether the legal right in question is determined based on
common law and statutory causes of action, or whether it is based on a
recognized writ, the legal right approach to standing fit well into the
structure of the rules of procedure, particularly pleadings. Pleading a
writ correctly, or stating facts sufficient to give notice to the defendant
of the cause of action, would also serve the purpose of establishing that
the plaintiff had standing because the two inquiries bottomed on the
same question: Did the plaintiff state a legally cognizable claim? The
federal courts needed to look no further than the motion to dismiss for
a procedural tool to determine standing-a procedure which comes
conveniently at the start of the litigation when a court should determine
whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. At the motion to
dismiss stage, the court is supposed to ask whether, if all the plaintiffs
allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff has asserted a claim for

different perspective, see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004), which argues that current standing doctrine is justified
by historical sources.
25. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 178 (discussing various writs, including writs available to the
public at large to bring suit).
26. FED. R. Cv. P. 8(a)(2).
27. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939), overruled in part by Bond v.
United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011); Sunstein, supra note 24, at 181.
28. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 182 (explaining that during this period, "the principal
question, for purposes of standing, was whether the law had conferred a cause of action").
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relief.29 The old standing inquiry asked even less of the court. It had
only to determine whether the plaintiff had filed a writ recognized by
common law or statute. If so, then there was a case or controversy that
the court could decide, and the plaintiff had Article III standing to sue.
All this changed in 1970. That year, the Supreme Court decided
two cases that shifted the standing inquiry from law to facts. 30 Under
this new analysis, standing required showing (1) an "injury in fact" and
(2) that this injury was "arguably within the zone of interests" of the
statute. 31 As Cass Sunstein explains, the basis for these new
requirements in either the APA or Article III was very weak. 32
Nevertheless, the language took on a life of its own, and this shift
marked a major change in standing doctrine and in the procedure for
determining whether a party has standing to sue.
The Court may have thought that moving the inquiry from a
question of law to a question of fact would produce a simpler analysis.
Instead of asking whether a person ought to have a legal right, which
is evidently a normative question, the new inquiry shifted the focus to
objectively ascertainable facts. The problem with this approach from a
conceptual perspective is that the standing inquiry must still consider
which injuries ought to be judicially cognizable. There are many events
in the world that people can describe as an injury, and even spend the
time and effort to file suit about, yet a court will find that there is no
standing because the injury is not one the law recognizes. 33
The conceptual problem is significant. Equally significant is
what demanding a factual inquiry does to the procedural structure in
which standing must be determined. An inquiry into whether there is a
statutory or common law cause of action fits quite well within the
structure of the motion to dismiss because a court need not look beyond
the pleadings to determine whether a cause of action exists. An inquiry
into whether the plaintiff was in fact injured requires the court to go
beyond assertions in the pleadings and to turn to evidence. It raises
29.

5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 1357

(3d

ed., updated Apr. 2017) ("[T]he district judge will accept the pleader's description of what happened
to him or her along with any conclusions that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.").
30. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Sunstein, supra note 24, at 169-170.
31. DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 152, 153.
32. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 185.
33. Id. at 189-190. As Sunstein explains beautifully:
[T]here are innumerable "injuries in fact" produced by public and private action. Many
of those injuries might well produce lawsuits. But an injury can become judicially
cognizable if and only if it has received legal status from some source of law. To this
extent, the Data Processing Court's attempted shift from law to fact was doomed to fail
from the beginning.
Id. at 191-92.
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questions about what burden of proof the plaintiff must meet to
demonstrate injury-must the plaintiff prove injury by a
preponderance of the evidence (the same standard the plaintiff must
meet at trial), or merely show that her claim of injury is plausible, or
meets some other, lower standard? If the plaintiff must demonstrate
her injury by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant or the
court must be given an opportunity to review the evidence, which in
turn requires some form of discovery in advance of the motion.
The problem is made worse by subsequent developments in
standing doctrine which have expanded the injury-in-fact requirement.
Today, a plaintiff needs to show three things to demonstrate that she
has standing to sue. First, "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury
in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest" which is both
"concrete and particularized" and "imminent" rather than hypothetical
or conjectural. 34 Second, there is a causation requirement; "there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of." 3 5 Third, the injury must be "likely" to be "redressed by a favorable
decision." 36 Furthermore, "Article III demands that an 'actual
controversy' persist throughout all stages of litigation." 37
Assume that the facts alleged seem, at the commencement of the
litigation, to indicate an injury in fact. If at some point later in the
litigation the facts are discovered to be different, must the case be
dismissed for lack of standing? If this occurs at trial, would the court be
required to dismiss the case for lack of standing or to issue a judgment
on the merits? It cannot do both. And if the court dismisses for lack of
standing at a late stage, what is the preclusive effect of this
determination?
To understand these problems, take an easy case. This case is
easy because it is a traditional private law case that does not raise the
ideological problems the Supreme Court struggles with in the standing
context. 38 Suppose that a plaintiff sues in federal court for breach of a
debt contract and claims that she has lent the defendant $100,000.
Traditionally, the plaintiff would have brought a writ of assumpsit. 39
Today, a plaintiff would likely bring a state law cause of action for
34. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
37. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568
U.S. 85, 90-91 (2013)). The earliest reference to this rule is Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459
n.10 (1974).
38. See Fallon, supranote 23, at 1096-97 (discussing ideological differences in approaches to
standing questions among Supreme Court Justices).
39. See Assumpsit, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "assumpsit" as a
"common-law action for breach of [an express or implied] promise or for breach of a contract").
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breach of contract. Under a standing rule that requires a legal right,
the plaintiff unquestionably has standing regardless of the result. Now
suppose that at trial, the plaintiff loses. Worse yet, suppose she loses
because of a factual determination that the defendant had paid the debt
on time. It turns out that she had suffered no injury. Under the current
rule, the plaintiff lacked standing at the commencement of the
litigation. As a result, the federal court lacks the power to issue a
judgment in the case and must dismiss on standing grounds-even
though the court has already made a determination on the merits and
both parties have gone to the trouble of attempting to prove their case. 4 0
What is the effect of this dismissal? A dismissal on standing
grounds is preclusive only as to the standing determination itself.4 1 This
is because the court lacked the power to make a merits determination.
The crux of the standing inquiry is, after all, whether the court has the
power to decide this case. Should the plaintiff attempt to bring a second
lawsuit against the same defendant for the same debt in federal court,
the court ought to reject the suit for lack of standing without further
factual inquiry because the standing question was already determined
in the initial case. But that may not be the end of the matter, because
the plaintiff may be able to pursue the same suit in state court. Because
there has been no determination on the merits for preclusion purposes
and because state courts are not subject to Article III standing
requirements, she would not be claim precluded from proceeding in
state court.42 This result is quite silly. And while it may seem unlikely,
a structurally similar claim that plaintiffs who have lost at trial lack
standing was made to the Supreme Court in the October 2015 term. 43

40.

I concede that no defendant would make a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

in such a case unless there was something else going on, and it is likely that the court would not
raise the issue on its own because it can proceed on hypothetical jurisdiction. See generally
Clermont, supra note 4, at 321-24.
41. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3531.15 ("A decision finding standing should
support issue preclusion, despite the jurisdictional characterization, if the same issue of standing
arises in subsequent litigation. The vagaries of standing theory are such, however, that it may
often be difficult to conclude that the same issue is presented." (citing Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d
879, 887-890 & n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); see also Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213,
1218-19 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "the district court's standing ruling precludes [the
defendant] from relitigating the standing issue . .. but does not preclude his claim").
42. She would be issue precluded from relitigating the question of Article III jurisdiction in a
subsequent proceeding, which would affect the set of cases that is exclusively within the
&

jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE

PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION

§ 4436

(2d ed. updated Dec. 2017) (noting that "[a]lthough a dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, it does preclude

relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question").
43. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a collective action alleging failure to pay for donning
and doffing of protective gear, amici argued that because some employees were found not to be
owed back pay at trial, they lacked standing to sue. For a critique of these arguments, see Brief of
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The problems illustrated in this hypothetical are real. For
example, courts are not sure what standard to apply to standing
questions at the pleading stage. Some apply a more lenient standard
akin to notice pleading; others applied a more rigorous standard even
before plausibility pleading became the law. 4 4 Furthermore, as the
Court explains, although "standing generally is a matter dealt with at
the earliest stages of litigation, usually on the pleadings, it sometimes
remains to be seen whether the factual allegations of the complaint
necessary for standing will be supported adequately by the evidence
adduced at trial."4 5 This puts courts in the position of deciding standing

at summary judgment or after trial. 46 The Second Circuit has
commented on this issue, noting that "there is a logical difficulty in
determining standing based on the results of a trial, the propriety of
which itself depends upon the determination of standing." 47 As a result,
some courts upon reaching the trial stage have simply ignored standing
doctrine, 4 8 despite the rule that standing is not waivable. 49
One response might be simply to recognize that standing to sue
will be found in "cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to and resolved by the judicial process."5 0 An action for debt
that would have traditionally been brought as a writ of assumpsit would

&

Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents at *2-3, Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2015) (No. 14-1146), 2015 WL 5719742.
44. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3531.15 (discussing the varying approaches
applied to standing issues at the pleading stage). Compare FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 231 (1990) ("It is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be 'inferred argumentatively
from averments in the pleadings,' . . . but rather 'must affirmatively appear in the record.'" (first
quoting Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 284 (1883), and then quoting Mansfield, C.
L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))), holding modified by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts
D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004), with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 104
(1998) ("This case is on appeal from a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings, so we must
presume that the general allegations in the complaint encompass the specific facts necessary to
support those allegations.").
45. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979).
46. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (standing disputed after trial); Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (standing decided at summary judgment); Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.21 (1982) (noting that plaintiff who had adequately pleaded
standing would still need to prove it suffered an injury at trial); United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973) (noting that
allegations of an injury suffered "must be true and capable of proof at trial").
47. United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 76-79 (2d Cir.
2002) (explaining that standing in a forfeiture proceeding serves only a functional purpose-to
determine whether the claimant has a legitimate interest in contesting forfeiture).
48. ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 441 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he proper course ... is ... to
accept jurisdiction and address the objection as an attack on the merits, . . . which we do here.").
49. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008) ("[W~e
bear an independent obligation to assure ourselves that jurisdiction is proper before proceeding to
the merits."); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 347 n.1 (standing "is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver").
50. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
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qualify. Indeed, in similar cases the Court has found that there was
standing. But these cases preceded the sea change in standing doctrine
that occurred in the 1970s. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,
decided in 1937, the Court found standing to sue in an insurer's
declaratory judgment action based on the insured's failure to pay
premiums owed under a disability insurance policy. 5 1 And in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, decided in 1969, an inventor was granted standing in his suit
against a patent licensee for failure to pay royalties owed under a
patent licensing agreement. 52
More modern cases elide the problem. Most recently in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the Supreme
Court merely assumed that standing was available on a Lanham Act
claim without inquiring as to whether the plaintiff had in fact suffered
an injury (rather than merely alleging one). 53 The Court explained:
"Lexmark does not deny that Static Control's allegations of lost sales
and damage to its business reputation give it standing under Article III
to press its false-advertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do." 54
So one must ask, is it sufficient to state a cause of action or must the
plaintiff show injury, and if so, when? There is no consistent answer.
The current state of affairs invites continuous litigation of the standing
issue throughout the lawsuit and on appeal.
Even if in traditional private law cases there is a generally
agreed upon norm that adequately pleading a recognized cause of action
constitutes standing to sue, this poses several problems. First, the law
changes over time, including statutory law. It does not make sense to
interpret Article III to incorporate only cases and controversies
recognized at some earlier point in time.55 Second, given that the
doctrine is described as a universally applicable test by the Court, the
door is open to disputing whether there is an injury in fact in every case.
At the moment, standing is probably best understood as a doctrine that

&

51. 300 U.S. 227, 242-44 (1937).
52. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
53. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). For a discussion of the significance of Lexmark, see Henry
Paul Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity and the Preemption of State Law, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807 (2016).
54. 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
55. That tactic has not worked very well in the context of the jury right. For a taste of the
complexity of applying anachronistic legal concepts to modern law, see Chauffeurs, Teamsters
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 566 (1990). Such a rule would effectively replace
pleading with the old writ system through Article III, although there were good reasons for
jettisoning that system. In any event, according to Sunstein, the writ system would not achieve
the Court's desire to limit standing, as there were common law writs which permitted third-party
or "bystander" standing. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 178 (describing writs).
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is triggered in certain sets of cases. 56 As Richard Fallon has
demonstrated, the doctrine of standing has fragmented into ever
smaller substantive categories, which can be sliced and diced a variety
of ways.5 7 Even so, the doctrine is formally applicable to any federal
suit. The bottom line is that the stated rule requires the type of
evidentiary inquiry that must upend the ordinary structure of a lawsuit
in cases where the defendant (or the court) chooses to press it. As the
authors of a prominent federal practice treatise explain: "[I]t remains
necessary to decide how far to go in examining standing before trial.
The dangers to be guarded against are hasty decision, or a lengthy and
costly inquiry that delves too far into the merits of the litigation. It
seems clear that no uniform approach is possible."5 8
Now let us turn to how standing compares to various subject
matter jurisdiction inquiries, all of which ought to take place at the
commencement of the litigation for the same reasons as standing should
but, like standing, may be disputed at any time. Federal question cases
fit best with the idea of a default sequential order. The well pleaded
complaint rule explicitly bases its test on the allegations themselves,
fitting neatly into the motion to dismiss standard. 59 The imbedded
federal question exception, while adding some complexity to the
inquiry, is purely legal and can also be determined at the motion to
dismiss stage on the information presented in the complaint.6 0
Diversity jurisdiction is slightly more like standing because it
too involves a factual inquiry. Whether a defendant is a citizen of a
different state than the plaintiff is a question of fact. The court's
diversity jurisdiction ought to be decided at the commencement of the
litigation, but proof that there in fact is not complete diversity of
citizenship requires dismissal on jurisdictional grounds at any time
during the litigation. 61 Ordinarily, the process of determining diversity
jurisdiction in contested cases begins with the pleadings, because in
responding to the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations the defendant will

56. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 1062 (noting that although the Court presents standing as
a universally applicable test, it is not so applied).
57. Id. at 1071-1092.
58. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3531.15 (footnote omitted).
59. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 22, § 3566 (explaining that the well pleaded complaint
rule directs courts to "look only to the claim itself and ignore any extraneous material").
60. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (determining on a motion to dismiss
whether a state law claim requiring resolution of an embedded federal question-a hypothetical
patent issue-could properly be heard by the state court).

61. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 369 (1978) (dismissing case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction when true citizenship of defendant was determined on the third day
of trial); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 126-27 (1804) (dismissing case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction after trial).
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affirm or deny his state of citizenship or, instead of answering, will
move to dismiss. 62 If the answer indicates that there is not complete
diversity but the defendant does not move to dismiss, the court has the
power to do so on its own. 63 The requirement that the plaintiff state the
basis for jurisdiction and that the defendant respond provides a
safeguard against cases where there is not complete diversity going
forward. 6 4 Furthermore, the federal courts have consistently applied
the general rule "that, for purposes of determining the existence of
diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of the parties is to be determined
with reference to the facts as they existed at the time of filing." 6 5 That
rule is helpful in keeping the factual inquiry cabined to the
commencement of the litigation.
Still, it is true that in diversity jurisdiction, as in standing, a
contested question of citizenship may require discovery and an
evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss. At the motion to dismiss
stage, the court may look beyond the pleadings to affidavits and
documents, or even hold a hearing to determine jurisdiction. 66 And it
may be possible to find a defect in diversity late in the game, even at
trial. The Supreme Court has recognized this problem and expressly
considered the "policy goal of minimizing litigation over jurisdiction" in
its decisions. 67 So while the factual foundation for the diversity
jurisdiction determination presents a threat to the default sequential
order of the Federal Rules, that factual inquiry is more easily cabined
to the motion to dismiss stage.
Jurisdictional discovery, which is sometimes required to
determine whether diversity exists, is another example of upending the
textbook order of litigation. Although its origins are not well
established, it is said to have become a phenomenon in the district
courts in the 1960s. 68 The practice was not recognized by the Supreme

62. FED. R. CIv. P. 7 (answer); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss); FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h) (timing of motion to dismiss).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
64. See Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A court is not
required to conduct a searching inquiry into the truth of every uncontested jurisdictional
allegation."); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3602.1 (discussing the role pleadings
play in determining whether complete diversity exists).
65. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569-70 (2004); see also Mollan v.
Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) ("It is quite clear, that the jurisdiction of the Court
depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot
be ousted by subsequent events.").

66.

See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22,

§ 3602.1

(listing forms of evidence "from outside

the pleadings" that courts may consider).

67. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 580-81.
68. See generally S.I. Strong, JurisdictionalDiscovery in United States Federal Courts, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 497-98 (2010) (detailing the history of jurisdictional discovery in the
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Court until 1978, in the context of a class action, which is consistent
with the overall trend toward disintegration of the procedural law's
default sequential order over the last thirty-five years, as we shall see
in Part

11.69

Supplemental jurisdiction can also be decided at any time,
permitting departures from the textbook order. The doctrine long
precedes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 70 The development of
supplemental jurisdiction doctrine, however, has been responsive to the
changes in joinder doctrine in the Federal Rules, and it remains a better
fit with the Rules than standing doctrine does.7 1 Prior to the
promulgation of the Rules, and for some years thereafter, the test for
pendant claim jurisdiction was the "cause of action" test, which
determined whether a federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over
related state law claims by asking whether the federal and state claims
were part of the same cause of action. 72 In United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court-explicitly citing the Federal
Rules-adopted the now familiar transactions-based inquiry. 73
The emphasis in the pendent jurisdiction cases on discretion in
relation to the stage of the litigation has the negative result of
permitting cases to be dismissed even after trial. Justice Brennan

federal courts). Strong notes some examples of jurisdictional discovery as early as 1908, although
she calls these rare. Id. at 497 n.30. Almost no discovery was permitted at common law. Resnik,
supra note 17, at 392 n.64; Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42
YALE L.J. 863, 869-77 (1933).
69. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 & n.13 (1978) ("For example,
where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the facts bearing
on such issues.").
70. See, e.g., Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552, 558 (1924) (describing former rule for
ancillary jurisdiction and citing cases); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S.
256, 264 (1919) (discussing pendent claim jurisdiction); Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 823-24 (1824) (indicating basic rule).
71. However, the problem is a product of the FRCP, created by liberal joinder of both claims
and parties for subject matter jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction similarly existed prior to the
promulgation of the Federal Rules, but the current doctrine was developed in response to the
requirements of the rules, including the rules on compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g., Freeman v.

Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460-61 (1860) (recognizing ancillary jurisdiction over an intervenor's
nonfederal claim to property held in control by federal court); Richard D. Freer, Rethinking
Compulsory Joinder:A Proposalto RestructureFederalRule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1111 n.51
(1985) (stating that "[t]he current doctrine, however, has developed largely in response to the
procedural innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"). If diversity jurisdiction were read
very narrowly, it would be impossible for a defendant to bring a state law counterclaim, although
the rules so require. The courts accommodated. Id. at 1071-72 & n.54 (discussing compulsory
counterclaims, third-party claims, cross claims, claims in intervention as of right, and claims by a
third-party defendant against the original plaintiff as examples of the federal courts' grants of
ancillary jurisdiction following the lead of the Federal Rules).
72. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1933); Freer, supra note 71, at 1067-69.
73. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that "claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact"); Freer, supra note 71, at 1069.
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explained that although the "question of power will ordinarily be
resolved on the pleadings," in some cases "[p]retrial procedures or even
the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims,
or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated
at the pleading stage." 74 But note that in Gibbs the Court permitted the
state claim to stand despite the federal claim having been dismissed by
the judge after trial.7 5 This was an implicit recognition that discretion
should be exercised in favor of the textbook order to avoid jurisdictional
dismissals after trial. The statute codifies this possibility. 76
In summary, both standing and subject matter jurisdiction
doctrine pose a special challenge to the sequence of litigation because
these issues may be raised and decided at any time, even after trial,
leading to dismissal of the case without preclusive effect even if the case
has been decided on the merits. The evolution of standing doctrine since
1970 presents an especially acute version of this problem, because it
requires the court to make a factual determination that ordinarily
would be made only after discovery is complete. The factual
determination in the standing context is more central and more likely
to interfere with the textbook sequence of the lawsuit than any other
jurisdictional inquiry, but all these doctrines can result in jurisdictional
dismissals at the trial stage, which is inconsistent with the textbook
order of procedure.
B. The Motion to Dismiss
In the textbook procedural order, the defendant moves to
dismiss at the start of the litigation and, if the plaintiffs case survives
the motion, it moves on to the discovery stage.7 7 Today, plausibility
pleading requires a plaintiff to include sufficient factual allegations in
her complaint to render her claim plausible.7 8 The result is that to
survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must have access to evidence.

74. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.
75. Id. at 727-29. This may be an example of the Court being responsive to changes in the
procedural rules in structuring jurisdictional doctrines so that the system as a whole is
coordinated.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012) (permitting but not requiring dismissal if all claims over
which the court had original jurisdiction are dismissed). For the continuing difficulty this poses,
see Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018), in which a state claim was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1367 two and a half years after filing.
77. Until 2007, all that was required was notice pleading. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
78. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that an allegation "has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged"). On this transition, see generally
A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009).

2018]

PROCEDURAL DESIGN

839

Yet formal exchange of information is impossible because no action has
been filed. In some cases, the needed evidence is in the defendant's
hands or otherwise inaccessible to the plaintiff, such as evidence of the
defendant's mental state or documents solely in the defendant's
possession.79 The plaintiff in such a case will lose the motion, even if
she could have prevailed with access to information.
Plausibility pleading makes sense in cases where the plaintiff
has facts in her possession at the outset of the lawsuit or access to these
facts. 80 But where a plaintiff lacks information that she will ultimately
need to prove her case at trial, she must investigate and discover
information before filing. Information exchange, in other words, must
precede the complaint, upending the traditional order of litigation.8 1
Some states permit prefiling discovery under limited circumstances,8 2
but it is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 3
The change in formal pleading doctrine began with the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which instituted a higher
pleading standard for securities cases in hopes of curbing the number
of securities suits. 84 While the law did not reduce filings, it signaled a
change in doctrine towards more fact-based pleading, which in turn
spurred plaintiffs to conduct prefiling investigations. 85 About twenty
years later, the Supreme Court revamped pleadings doctrine in a set of
cases involving claims of conspiracy. 86 In these cases, the Court held

79. The Federal Rules recognize this, but the decisional law does not. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
("Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.").
This is an example of a failure of systemic coordination.

80.

By contrast, notice pleading assumes that the defendant is the cheapest cost provider of

information.

81. Defendants will rarely provide any information in advance of a lawsuit. Some sort of legal
compulsion is almost invariably necessary for plaintiffs to obtain access to information that
(potential) defendants have in their possession. Sometimes information may also be in the hands
of administrative agencies or other third parties and subject to the Freedom of Information Act or
similar state laws.
82. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinney 2017) (permitting prefiling discovery with
court order).

83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) ("A party may not seek discovery from any source before the
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court
order."). The triggering event for even initial disclosures is the commencement of the action.
84. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)
to (2) (2012).
85. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
plaintiffs lawyers in securities-fraud litigation have to conduct elaborate pre-complaint
investigations. . . .").
86. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
But see Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fallof PlausibilityPleading?,69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 335
(2016) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal did not replace notice pleading with plausibility pleading,
as some feared).
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that a plaintiff must assert facts supporting the plausibility of her claim
and that what the court called "conclusory" allegations (such as the
allegation that there was a conspiracy, for example) would not suffice.8 7
The lower courts had been applying something more rigorous than
notice pleading for some time, and it is widely agreed that complaints
have generally been detailed and fact intensive, so the change in formal
doctrine was not as significant a break as it might seem from reading
only Supreme Court opinions.8 8 Nevertheless, the special circumstance
of conspiracy allegations (that the very nature of a conspiracy is to be
kept a secret, creating real barriers to plaintiffs who would like to assert
facts to support their claims) raise the question of how plaintiffs who do
not have access to hidden information, but who have a basis to suspect
a conspiracy, are to write an adequate complaint.
This development has spurred scholars to suggest that the
Federal Rules should provide for predismissal discovery.89 This
suggestion is inventive, but it also comes at the cost of disordering the
textbook sequence. Evaluation of proof is designed to occur at summary
judgment or trial, not at the motion to dismiss stage. This explains the
consensus that information ought to be requested after the plaintiff has
asserted why she is suing, so that the discovery demands can be tailored
to the questions that ultimately are to be tried.
A similar "front-loading" problem is evident in so-called Lone
Pine orders in mass tort litigation, which require the plaintiffs to show
evidence supporting their claims at a preliminary stage, typically to
survive a motion to dismiss. 90 A Lone Pine order can require the
plaintiffs to present expert testimony at the motion to dismiss stage, for
example, despite the usual rule that courts decide a motion to dismiss
based only on the allegations in the complaint.9 1 Notably, Lone Pine
87. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
88. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiZ. L. REV. 987, 988
(2003) (noting the tendency of some lower federal courts to "impose non-Rule-based heightened
pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine"); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986)
(observing that many lower courts have promoted fact pleading by refusing to accept "conclusory"
allegations).
89. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the DetrimentalEffect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARKL.
REV. 65, 67 (2010) (arguing that predismissal discovery resolves some of the problems created by
plausibility pleading).
90. 'The name originated with an unpublished state-court case management order in Lore v.
Lone Pine Corp., 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). Usually, such an order requires
the plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing of evidence supporting their claims." 15 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION

§ 3866

n.22 (4th ed.

updated Apr. 2017).
91. See, e.g., Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Tr., 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)
(upholding Lone Pine order prior to discovery); Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th
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orders require plaintiffs to produce proofs that are in their possession,
and could be understood as a more rigorous substitute for initial
disclosures if they did not precede the opening of discovery. 92 Some
courts permit such motions at the very start of the litigation, although
others have held that a determination on a motion to dismiss or even
discovery is first required. 93
In summary, and as illustrated by the anecdote introducing the
Article, a motion to dismiss can be an occasion to review and evaluate
the evidence in a case or a test of the legal sufficiency of the claim,
depending on how a judge chooses to exercise her discretion.
C. Class Certification
When the class action rule was adopted, the idea was that a class
certification order would be issued at the commencement of the
litigation. 94 Class action doctrine was not well developed in the 1960s
and 1970s, although class actions were just as controversial then as
they are today. 95 For example, federal jurisdiction over class actions
was very limited, and state class action rules were only beginning to be
adopted. 96 Indeed, state courts would often refuse to certify national

Cir. 2000) (upholding district court order requiring plaintiffs to submit prediscovery expert
affidavits to establish certain elements of their claim); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 384,
389 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (granting, in part, a prediscovery order requiring plaintiffs to present proof of
injury and causation); see also In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2015)
(approving of Lone Pine orders in dicta). For a general overview, see Adinolfe v. United Techs.
Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (11th Cir. 2014), which discusses uses of Lone Pine orders and
circuit court opinions where such orders have been used. For the general rule, see supra text
accompanying note 90. Some courts, however, will consider documents incorporated into the
complaint as well as facts taken into consideration as a matter of judicial notice. See 5B WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 29, § 1357.
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (listing types of information that "a party must, without
awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties"). Initial disclosures are to be provided
within fourteen days after the Rule 26(f) conference. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). There is no similar
time frame for disclosure of expert evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
93. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1168 ("As a general matter, we do not think that it is legally
appropriate (or for that matter wise) for a district court to issue a Lone Pine order requiring factual
support for the plaintiffs' claims before it has determined that those claims survive a motion to
dismiss under Twombly."); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 (E.D. La. 2008)
(Lone Pine order used after case had been pending for three years and subject to significant
discovery).

94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1966) (repealed 2003) (requiring that class certification be
determined "as soon as practicable").
95. David Marcus, The History of the Modern ClassAction, PartI: Sturm Und Drang, 19531980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 610-13 (2013) (discussing early controversy over class actions and
noting the fact that the arguments have not changed since the 1960s).
96. Id. at 628; Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973) (holding that multiple
plaintiffs must each meet the amount in controversy requirement), superseded by statute as stated
in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005); Snyder v. Harris, 394
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class actions. 97 One basic rule of the road, however, was that class
certification, although it could be revisited, should be decided near the
commencement of the litigation. 98 Evidence of this norm can be seen in
rulings such as Sosna v. Iowa, in which the Supreme Court held that a
class action may continue to be maintained even if the class
representative's claim later became moot. 99 Sosna is reminiscent of the
rule for diversity jurisdiction that determination of citizenship is based
on facts at the commencement of the litigation. 10 0 Both rules recognize
a preference for deciding threshold matters at the commencement of the
lawsuit.
More controversial was the question of how much a court could
consider the merits as part of or antecedent to the class certification
inquiry. The recent and sharp trend has been towards a proceeding on
class certification that looks more and more like a trial, and therefore
cannot be conducted at the beginning of the litigation. The story begins
in 1974 with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.101 In that case, the district
court had held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff class was
likely to prevail on the merits. 102 The purpose of this hearing was to
decide whether to shift the cost of notice to the defendant. 103 Rejecting
this approach, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff bears the cost
of notice and that the question for the court to determine on class
certification is only whether the plaintiff class meets the class action
rule requirements. 104 This holding plagued the courts for many years,
spawning arguments over how much of the merits should be considered
at the class certification stage. 105 Mostly, lower courts understood Eisen
to mean that they could not evaluate the merits as part of the class
certification procedure.10 6 As we shall see, this changed as the class
action matured.

U.S. 332, 338 (1969) (holding that class members may not aggregate their claims to meet the
amount in controversy requirement).

97. Marcus, supra note 95, at 628.
98. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (holding
that failure to move for class certification prior to trial is evidence of inadequacy of class
representative). The original rule required that class certification be determined "as soon as
practicable." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1966) (repealed 2003). That language was changed in 2003.
99. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
100. See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text discussing subject matter jurisdiction.
101. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
102. Id. at 177.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 178 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971)).
105. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1265-66 (2002).
106. Id.
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The Supreme Court's rationale in Eisen was that a preliminary
merits hearing "may color the subsequent proceedings and place an
unfair burden on the defendant."10 7 The conventional wisdom had been
that if plaintiffs had to pay their own notice costs, this would serve as a
crude quality screening mechanism: since high notice costs could only
be recouped if the class action were successful, risky suits would not be
brought in the first place. 108 As class action practice developed and the
"blackmail" argument against class actions gained traction, merits or
something that resembled merits determinations at earlier stages of the
litigation became more popular with the defense bar.10 9 That is,
potential defendants wanted to winnow class action suits as early as
possible both through notice costs and by requiring earlier merits
determinations. The strategy of increasing costs has now bled into every
class action requirement, in the process upending the textbook order of
litigation.
The move towards a more fact-intensive, trial-like process for
class certification began in the early 1980s but has accelerated more
recently. Conceptually, this transition rested on the idea that the class
certification inquiry is "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiffs cause of action."1 10 This insight was first noted
in a case denying an interlocutory appeal of class certification. The
language emerged in the 1970s, but these seeds did not sprout until the
1980s. The history of the relationship between interlocutory appeals
(which upend the default sequence) and class certification merits
determinations (which also upend it) highlights the insight that one of
the main drivers of disintegration was the Court's concern about the
rise of complex litigation combined with a lack of attention to systemic
procedural design.
Early on, plaintiffs tried to obtain interlocutory appeals of
certification denials based on a theory that denial of certification

107. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
108. Marcus, supra note 95, at 634-35; see also Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REV.
664, 689 (1979) (defending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)). Imposing notice costs is
unlikely to limit filings much if the class action bar is well financed.
109. The "blackmail" argument is that a very small risk of a very large judgment will cause a
defendant to settle meritless claims. For a discussion and critique of the argument, see Charles
Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certificationand Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 13851430 (2003).
110. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)). The quoted language comes not from a class action case,
but rather from a case involving the rejection of an appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
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resulted in a "death knell" for the class action." The idea was that if
class certification was denied, and the claims were too small to be
brought individually, the case could not go forward even if it had merit.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in 1978 on two grounds.
First, it held that by operation of the class action rule, the class
certification order is provisional. 112 Second, it ruled that the class
certification determination is enmeshed with legal and factual
questions that go to the merits, so it does not meet the requirements of
a collateral order. 113 The insight that closed the door to interlocutory
appeals as a matter of course until recently-that class certification is
nded up being used in decisions
inextricable from the merits
governing the standard for certification. Because class certification
inquiries overlap with the merits, the hearing on class certification
approaches a trial. Ironically, a decision maintaining the textbook order
of civil litigation in one context (limiting interlocutory appeals) was
used to justify upending the order of litigation by opening the door to
requiring a more rigorous class certification hearing.
The first step down this road was General Telephone Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, a Title VII case decided in 1982.114 In that case the
Court explained: "[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to
probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question." 115 Still, Eisen's language cabining merits inquiries at the
class certification stage remained influential. 116 The trend towards
more rigorous hearings on certification gained steam starting in
2001.117 This change coincided with two developments. First, in 1998
the Federal Rules were amended to permit interlocutory appeals for
class actions.1 18 Appellate decisions tended to raise the bar for class
111. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469. The door was opened to interlocutory appeals in Eisen, which
came to the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal, 417 U.S. at 162, but that door was soon
shut.
112. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), which today is
found at 23(c)(1)(C) and states, "An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered
or amended before final judgment").
113. Id. at 469.
114. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
115. Id. at 160.
116. "Even today, almost thirty years after the decision, courts commonly cite Eisen for a
general rule barring a preliminary merits inquiry and requiring a certification analysis focused on
allegations rather than evidence." Bone & Evans, supra note 105, at 1266.
117. In 2001, the Seventh Circuit had held that class certification may require factual
determinations that go to the merits. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2001). The Third Circuit articulated an even stronger view a few years later. In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring factual determinations
supporting Rule 23 findings by a preponderance of the evidence and extending these requirements
to expert testimony), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009).
118. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) (adopted in 1998).
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certification. Second, the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") drew
class actions of any significant value into the federal courts, meaning
that federal decisions had a greater reach. 119 The more rigorous
approach to certification was validated in the Supreme Court's 2011
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 12 0 Lower courts began to
require Daubert hearings on class certification during this period. 121
The law has not moved all the way to requiring a full trial on the
merits at class certification. For example, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, the Supreme Court explained that
"Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits
inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered
to the extent-but only to the extent-that they are relevant to
determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification
are satisfied." 122 Although courts are required to have a rigorous
hearing that approaches a trial, the Amgen Court reaffirmed that class
certification determinations are provisional and not to be relied on later
in the litigation. 12 3 The rule that merits determinations at class
certification are nonbinding made sense from an efficiency perspective
when class certification determinations were made on very little
evidence, but it makes less sense when class certification
determinations are subject to the same evidentiary standards
applicable at trial.
In some cases, full merits discovery and case development are
now required before a class can be certified. 124 Classes are now certified
long after litigation has commenced but before trial has occurred. That
change in time frame is supported by a slight change to the language of
the class action rule in 2003 that recognized this slower road to
certification. 125 One result of this delay has been to give defendants the
119. CAFA broadened the citizenship requirement and reduced the amount in controversy
requirement to allow more class actions to be brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
120. 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
121. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case that seemed to present that question,
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), only to learn that the issue had been waived by the
defendant. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 754 (2013).
122. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 464-67 (2013).
123. Id. at 477 (stating that "[i]f the class is certified, materiality might have to be shown all
over again at trial"); Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 n.6 (explaining that in securities cases, plaintiffs
will have to prove that their shares were traded on an efficient market twice: once at certification
and again at trial); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that "the determination as to a Rule 23 requirement ... is not binding on the trier of facts, even if
that trier is the class certification judge"), decision clarified on denial of reh'g, 483 F.3d 70, 72 (2d
Cir. 2007).
124. Klonoff, supra note 121, at 756 (explaining that the result of these developments is "that
the class certification decision must inevitably be delayed, possibly until the end of full merits
discovery").
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
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opportunity to pick off class representatives. 126 Another has been that
when judges evaluate evidence and make factual determinations at
class certification, they usurp the role of the jury. 127 This problem
brings us to a final way that class certification procedures alter the
traditional sequence of litigation, which also implicates the jury right.
Certification may be revisited throughout the litigation, even after
trial. 128
In sum, procedure in class actions is now disordered in three
ways. First, merits determinations are moved to the beginning of the
suit. The class certification inquiry has been transformed from a
preliminary inquiry engaged in at the commencement of the litigation
when evidence has yet to be developed into a merits inquiry that is
predicated on nearly full merits discovery and significant fact
finding. 129 Second, those determinations are subject to appeal at any
point in the process, rather than only at the end. Third, class
certification decisions may be continually revisited, even after trial.
D. Summary Judgment
Developments in the interpretation of the summary judgment
rule demonstrate comfort with determinations of fact and law made
without reference to the textbook sequence of litigation. Summary
judgment began as an equitable procedure incorporated into the
Federal Rules promulgated in 1938. The idea of summary judgment
then was that it would "limit the scope of disputes and dispose of
frivolous issues and claims." 13 0 Summary judgement was not expected
to be used very often.1 31 There were too many issues of material fact to

126. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, it was the law until recently that in order to prevent
this from happening, plaintiffs had to file a preliminary motion for class certification. Damasco v.
Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled by Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796
F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015). This motion was merely a placeholder; the real motion could not be filed
until after merits discovery. The idea that an unaccepted settlement offer can moot a case seems
to have been put to rest by the Court's recent decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct.
663, 672 (2016), which held that an offer of settlement did not moot the case when the offer was
not accepted by the plaintiff.
127. See Klonoff, supra note 121, at 756.
128. Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 2016) (decertifying class after trial).
129. Some courts permit defendants to move to strike class allegations prior to discovery.
Klonoff, supranote 121, at 756-57; see Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 950
(6th Cir. 2011) (allowing motion to strike class allegations). But see Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797
F.3d 607, 615 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting defendants' motion to strike class allegations), rev'd on
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).
130. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 979 (1987).
131. Id. at 980.
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dispose of them easily through summary judgment, especially given the
liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules. 132
There is a dispute over the question of whether the intent of the
rule drafters in 1938 was that summary judgment be rarely used. 133
Some claim that summary judgment was widely understood as a
disfavored and risky motion for litigants to make. For example, in the
1960s the Court explained in a complex antitrust case: "Trial by
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the
hallmark of 'even handed justice.' "134 By contrast, Judge Clark
explained (dissenting from a denial of summary judgment in a
copyright case): "It is, indeed, more necessary in the system of simple
pleading now enforced in the federal courts; for under older procedures,
useless and unnecessary trials could be avoided, in theory at least, by
the then existing demurrer and motion practice." 135
Whatever one's position on the role of summary judgment prior
to 1980-as a rarity or a stopgap-all this changed in 1986. That year
the Court decided the summary judgment trilogy, 136 making clear that
summary judgment should be more widely used. Two of the three cases
in that trilogy concerned complex litigation. Celotex was an asbestos
case, decided as asbestos cases were filling both state and federal
courts, 1 37 and Matsushita was an antitrust suit and a multidistrict
litigation. 138 As a doctrinal matter, these cases expanded the
availability of summary judgment by easing the burden on a defendant
moving for summary judgment and by giving district courts more
discretion to determine the existence of issues appropriate for a trial. 139
132. Id.
133. Compare William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984), with Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the

Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 141 (1988). See also Patricia M. Wald, Summary
Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (1998).
134. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); see also Arthur R. Miller,
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1, 130 (2010) (questioning whether "the current system of pleadings and pretrial motions
undermine[s] important system values," and stating that "'[slpeedy' and 'inexpensive' should not
be sought at the expense of what is 'just' ").
135. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946).
136. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
137. Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failureof the
Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 261 (2006) (describing patterns of asbestos filings).
138. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 388 F. Supp. 565 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
139. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment,
100 YALE L.J. 73, 79 (1990):
First, these cases eased the initial burden placed on the party moving for summary
judgment by permitting a summary judgment movant to prevail without having to
establish fully the nonexistence of material facts in dispute. Second, the Court allowed
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The trend towards greater use of summary judgment preceded
the Court's intervention, 1 4 0 but even so, before Celotex the summary
judgment doctrine was understood to require the defendant to
demonstrate that she would prevail at trial. 141 Most courts read Celotex
as lightening or even limiting that burden, allowing summary judgment
motions to be brought before discovery. 1 4 2 The case was widely
understood to place "essentially no burden at all on a defendant seeking
summary judgment." 1 4 3
So understood, the Celotex decision upends the textbook order of
civil litigation. Instead of conducting discovery and then moving for
summary judgment once the claims and defenses can be evaluated in
light of the facts, the defendant's summary judgment motion can
precede discovery. In such a case, if the information tending to prove
her case is in the plaintiffs possession, she can include it in her motion
opposing summary judgment. If she does not have access to the
information, she may ask the court to defer or deny the motion. 14 4
Courts have recognized the tension between Celotex and the sequence
implicitly endorsed by other federal rules. To restore the default
sequencing, a minority of courts have interpreted Celotex to require that
the defendant show reasonable attempts to acquire evidence through
discovery before moving for summary judgment. 145
Concerns about discovery abuse and the idea that summary
judgment can be a tool to limit discovery and thereby upend the
traditional order of litigation are most prevalent in summary judgment
greater district court latitude in determining the existence of issues meriting trial,
thereby easing the grant of summary judgment.

But see Adam N. Steinman, The IrrepressibleMyth of Celotex Reconsidering Summary Judgment
Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 96 (2006) (questioning the
true extent of the expansion of summary judgment availability).
140. The likelihood of a summary judgment motion being brought increased from about twelve
percent in 1975 to seventeen percent in 1986 (when the trilogy was decided), and then to nineteen
percent in 1988. Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Centuryof Summary Judgment Practice in Six

FederalDistrict Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882 (2007).
141. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970) (clarifying the requirements of
the defendant for summary judgment); see also David Shapiro, Motions-The Story of Celotex: The
Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES

343-70 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (arguing against a reading of the summary judgment rule
requiring a defendant to present evidence when the defendant does not bear the burden of proof).
142. As one summary judgment treatise notes, the "caselaw is very clear that 'the fact that
discovery is not complete-indeed, has not begun-need not defeat the motion.'" EDWARD BRUNET
ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE

§

7:1 (updated Dec. 2017).

143. Steinman, supra note 139, at 120. Steinman argues that this interpretation is incorrect.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(1).
145. Steinman, supra note 139, at 114 (a policy rationale for this approach is "to maintain the
integrity of the discovery process set forth elsewhere in the Federal Rules"); see, e.g., Nissan Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (showing how a minority of
courts have interpreted Celotex).
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opinions in civil rights cases, although they are not limited to that
context. 146 The rhetoric in Supreme Court summary judgment opinions
in civil rights cases supports the view that these cases have been
treated differently with respect to the order of discovery, summary
judgment, and trial. Even before the summary judgment trilogy, the
Court expressed concern for government defendants in civil rights cases
being subjected to "the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery."1 47 The doctrine of qualified immunity developed to address
these concerns, and procedural changes followed.
Shortly after the trilogy, the Court again considered the
relationship between its approach to summary judgment and civil
rights cases in the 1987 case Anderson v. Creighton.14 8 Anderson was a
civil rights action brought against an FBI agent and seeking damages
for a warrantless search. 149 The defendant had brought a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. There had been no discovery. The Court
addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff was entitled to discovery
before a summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in a
footnote, writing that discovery can be "'peculiarly disruptive of
effective government."'1 5 0 It explained: "For this reason, we have
emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at
the earliest possible stage of a litigation."1 5 1 The Court then stated that
on remand the district court should first determine "whether the
actions the Creightons allege Anderson to have taken are actions that
a reasonable officer could have believed lawful." 152 If the answer to this
question was no "and if the actions Anderson claims he took are
different from those the Creightons allege," then discovery may be
necessary. 153 This approach does not fit with the textbook order.
Summary judgment would ordinarily only be appropriate once there
had been discovery on the question of what actions the FBI agent
actually took and what information he had at the time. The Court
instead collapsed summary judgment with a motion to dismiss.
The difference between the two motions is that the motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally considered not to go to the
146. Cecil at al., discussed supra note 140, use randomly selected cases to demonstrate the
increase in summary judgment motions, but their study demonstrates only correlation, not

causation.
147. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
148. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987).
149. Id. at 637.
150. Id. at 646 n.6 (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The summary

judgment motion, by contrast, does go to the merits. Of course, the final
provision in Rule 12(b) does permit a motion to dismiss to be converted
into a summary judgment motion, but until the 1980s that provision
would have been difficult to utilize because of the requirements for
bringing a summary judgment motion. 155 As a prominent treatise
explains: "[A] summary-judgment motion typically is based on the
pleadings as well as any affidavits, depositions, and other forms of
evidence relevant to the merits of the challenged claim or defense that
are available at the time the motion is made." 156 The qualified immunity
decisions enabled the merging of motions to dismiss and summary
judgment in civil rights cases. But it is important to recognize that this
is not only a doctrine that affects qualified immunity cases: Celotex is a
tort case, Matsushita an antitrust action, and Anderson a defamation
case. All are disfavored, by some lights at least, but quite different.
The procedural rules permit a summary judgment motion to be
brought at any time (although presumably after pleadings have been
filed), 15 7 but the requirement that the moving party show "that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law" 158 ought in most cases to follow some fact
discovery. One reason for this is that until very recently, there had been
general agreement that the facts should be interpreted in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. 159 Although the rules can be read to
permit summary judgment before any discovery is conducted, indeed
before the defendant has even answered, the determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate (as opposed to a dismissal for
defective pleading) ordinarily requires the application of the law to the
facts of the case, and discovery is the method by which facts are
ascertained and developed for this purpose.1 6 0 As Justice Jackson wrote

154. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 2713

(4th

ed. updated Apr. 2017).
155. The possibility of converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment was
added in 1948. Id.
156. Id.
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (the default deadline for filing summary judgment is "any time until
30 days after the close of all discovery").
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
159. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris and the Future of Summary Judgment, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1351, 1357-58 (2015) (describing the general rule and the disruptive effect of Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007), on this rule).
160. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2010 revision of Rule 56 explains: "Although the
rule allows a motion for summary judgment to be filed at the commencement of an action, in many
cases the motion will be premature until the nonmovant has had time to file a responsive pleading
or other pretrial proceedings have been had." FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 2010
amendment.
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in 1948: "[S]ummary procedures, however salutary where issues are
clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of
far-flung import, on which this Court should draw inferences with
caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and
practice." 161
So far, we have seen how summary judgment has been
transformed into a motion that can be brought at the very beginning of
the suit. But summary judgment has also taken territory in the other
direction, preventing cases that seem to raise disputes of material fact
from being tried by evaluating facts without deference to the nonmoving
party. The displacement of trial by summary judgment is not yet
complete, and there are plenty of cases which guard the line between
one and the other at the Supreme Court level. Still, there are signals
that summary judgment may transform fully into a motion that allows
the judge to decide questions of fact ordinarily reserved for oral
presentation rather than determined on a paper record.
The most visible case illustrating this transformation, which is
still hotly disputed, is Scott v. Harris.16 2 This was a civil rights action
alleging excessive force when a police officer in a high-speed car chase
engaged in a maneuver that resulted in the plaintiff suffering
significant injuries. The officer's dashboard camera recording of the
chase was included in the summary judgment motion and eight
Justices, upon reviewing the video, agreed that no reasonable jury could
find for the plaintiff and that summary judgment was appropriate on
the basis of that video. 16 3 Rather than requiring that the video be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court
simply interpreted the video. In Scott two trends merged: that of
summary judgment displacing trial and the rise of interlocutory
appeals. The changing summary judgment standard, combined with the
law of qualified immunity, permits greater access to interlocutory
appeals. This is part of a larger trend eroding the general principle that
the appeal follows judgment. We turn to the rise in interlocutory
appeals in the next Section.
E. Appeals
In general, scholars and judges have long believed that the
appeal should come at the end of the litigation, after a determination of
the merits of the case. That is, appeals are only available from a final

161. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1948).
162. 550 U.S. 372.
163. Id.
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judgment.164 As Justice Frankfurter explained in 1940 in refusing to
grant an interlocutory appeal: "To be effective, judicial administration
must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by
permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified
cause."1 65 The final judgment rule "by forbidding piecemeal disposition
on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy" avoids
"enfeebling judicial administration." 1 6 6 Since the middle of the
twentieth century, however, three doctrinal avenues to interlocutory
appeal have upended this general rule: appeals available explicitly by
statute, the collateral order rule, and appellate mandamus. 167
Appeals during litigation are now always a possibility, even if
they are seldom used in many noncontroversial cases. As Adam
Steinman observed: "Although appellate courts exercise this discretion
quite sparingly (and justifiably so), it is fair to say that under the
prevailing judicial doctrines, no interlocutory trial court order is
categorically beyond an appellate court's jurisdiction."16 8 Steinman lists
more than twenty-two such categories, and these capture only some of
the available interlocutory appeals. 169 There have been many
complaints that the set of doctrines governing interlocutory appeals are
incoherent and too complex.170 The problem I identify is different: the
availability of interlocutory appeals is part of a larger set of doctrines
that taken together undo the default sequential order. An important
part of this story is that while the doctrinal beginnings of interlocutory
appeals can be traced back to the late 1950s, their proliferation is a
phenomenon of the 1980s through today.
Appellate jurisdiction is governed by statute. 171 Initially,
Congress permitted interlocutory appeals only in cases involving
injunctions, receiverships, and admiralty. 172 In 1958, Congress
expanded the federal courts' appellate jurisdiction by adding a provision
permitting appeals from certain additional orders, but these depended
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."). The Supreme Court initially
interpreted "final judgment" quite narrowly. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
165. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) (deciding that quashing a
motion denying a grand jury subpoena is not appealable).
166. Id.
167. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238
(2007).
168. Id. at 1242.
169. Id. at 1273-75.
170. Id. at 1238-39 (collecting criticisms); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood
Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIs. L. REV. 631, 662.
171. 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 (2012) (jurisdiction over appeals of final decisions); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(b) (jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)-(b).
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on district court discretion.1 7 3 Appeals under this statutory provision
are rarely available, both because the district courts veto them and
because the appellate courts have interpreted the statute narrowly. 174
The major source of interlocutory appeals is the collateral order
doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine was created in 1949 in Cohen v.
Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp., a shareholder derivative suit brought
in federal court.17 5 The subject matter of the suit is important because
the later proliferation of interlocutory appeals through the rulemaking
and legislative process has similarly focused on class actions and other
aggregate litigation. We shall see why in a moment. For now, it is only
necessary to remember that the genesis of the collateral order doctrine
is in complex litigation. New Jersey, the state in which the action in
Cohen was brought, had enacted a statute requiring shareholders to
post a bond to bring such a suit. 176 The district court held that the
shareholders did not need to post a bond and the company appealed.1 77
The Court was faced with deciding whether that decision was
appealable and, if so, whether it was correct.
The Court held in Cohen that there was a small class of cases
"which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral
to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 7 8 Today,
courts understand Cohen to impose a three-factor test.1 79 First, the
district court order must be "an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action." 80 Second, the order must be effectively
unreviewable.1 81 Third, the district court order must conclusively
determine the issue, and in that sense be "final."1 82 Justice Jackson,
writing for a unanimous Court with respect to the appealability issue,
explained how the collateral order doctrine did not violate the final
order rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because "appeal gives the upper
court a power of review, not one of intervention."1 8 3 He differentiated
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
174. Steinman, supra note 167, at 1245.
175. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
176. Id. at 550-51.
177. Id. at 545.
178. Id. at 546.
179. Steinman, supra note 167, at 1248.
180. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
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between decisions that are "unfinished or inconclusive" and decisions
that are final in the sense that the "District Court's action upon [the]
application was concluded and closed." 184
There have been attempts to apply this doctrine to
disqualification motions and discovery disputes, but so far this has not
been a successful avenue for review of such matters-they are instead
reviewed on a much more discretionary basis under the writ of
mandamus, discussed a bit later in this Section.1 8 5 But in one area
collateral order interlocutory appeals have proliferated: governmental
immunity. There, as we shall see, the lines that seemed easy to draw in
Cohen-between what is central to the merits and what is separate, and
between finality and incompleteness-have faded.
The Court opened the door to appeals based on governmental
immunity in a case involving a different type of immunity from suit:
double jeopardy. In 1977, in Abney v. United States, the Court held that
a defendant could appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 186 The Abney decision focused
on two arguments. First, the Court held that the question was truly
collateral in that it does not touch on the merits of the charge: whether
the defendant is guilty or not, he is entitled to protection from double
jeopardy. Second, the interlocutory decision is an important one,
because double jeopardy "is a guarantee against being twice put to trial
for the same offense."18 7 Allowing the case to go to trial and then
appealing is an insufficient protection.
The same rationale can be applied to immunities from suit. Thus
in Helstoski v. Meanor, the Court held that an interlocutory appeal was
available with respect to an indictment that violated a Congressman's
rights to immunity from suit under the Speech and Debate Clause.18 8
Shortly thereafter, in 1982, the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald found a
right to appeal determinations of absolute immunity. 189 In 1985, the
Court applied the same rule to the defense of qualified immunity. 190
184. Id.
185. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) ("Postjudgment appeals,
together with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the
vitality of the attorney-client privilege."); Cunningham v. Hamilton City, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999)
(denying interlocutory appeal from discovery sanctions); Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
511 U.S. 863, 882 (1994) (no interlocutory appeal from reopening of a settlement); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (holding that a disqualification order is not
appealable prior to judgment on the merits).
186. 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
187. Id. at 661.
188. 442 U.S. 500, 507 (1979).
189. 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982) (right to appeal presidential claim of absolute immunity for
official acts).
190. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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And in the 1990s, the Court expanded interlocutory appeals as of right
to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 191 Not only that, but the Court also
permitted multiple interlocutory appeals in such cases, from denials of
motions to dismiss as well as motions for summary judgment.1 92
Between 1979 and today, the landscape of interlocutory appeals
changed considerably to include routine interlocutory appeals in cases
involving governmental officers. 1 93
Qualified immunity does not fit easily into the Cohen test, even
if it is an immunity from suit rather than a defense.1 94 To make it fit,
the Court had to find a way to separate the qualified immunity
determination from the merits of the case. The problem is that the
inquiry in determining whether a governmental actor is entitled to
qualified immunity is whether he or she violated clearly established
law, which goes to the merits of the case-that is, the question of
whether the officer violated the law. The Court got around this problem
by asserting a conceptual separation between determinations of law,
which are more amenable to appellate review, and determinations of
fact. 195 Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent in Mitchell v. Forsyth,
however, that the inquiry in Cohen was not whether the issue was one
of law or fact, but rather whether it was separate from the merits of the
case. 1 9 6 But once the appellate door had been opened to other types of
immunity, qualified immunity easily made its way through. The
problem has been that the fact/law distinction is notoriously slippery.
The Court now finds itself determining what to most observers look like
issues of fact, or perhaps the application of law to facts, on interlocutory
appeals from summary judgment orders.1 9 7 The important observation
for our purposes is that these developments flip what is ordinarily
191. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) ("[T]he
value to the States of their Eleventh Amendment immunity . .. is for the most part lost as
litigation proceeds past motion practice.").
192. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 301 (1996).
193. Cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (denying interlocutory appeal in case
against a governmental official where the summary judgment motion concerned evidentiary
sufficiency, not qualified immunity).
194. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (stating that qualified immunity "is both a
defense to liability and a limited" immunity from the burdens of litigation).
195. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9 ("We emphasize at this point that the appealable issue is a
purely legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant)
support a claim of violation of clearly established law.").
196. Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe Court's test
effectively substitutes for the traditional test of completely separate from the merits a vastly less
stringent analysis of whether the allegedly appealable issue is not identical to the merits.").
197. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (reweighing evidence in a § 1983
action in order "to view the evidence ... in the light most favorable to [the nonmovant]); Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (requiring consideration of facts depicted in a videotape in a
§ 1983 action).
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assumed to be the order of civil litigation. Appeal comes before trial and
even before fact development.
To put these developments in context, the regular use of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate Constitutional violations dates from the early
1960s. 198 The doctrine of qualified immunity followed within ten years,
although it was not called by that name until 1974.199 That doctrine was
made useful in summary judgment determinations only in 1982.200 This
development set the stage for interlocutory appeals from summary
judgment discussed above. The growth of civil rights actions stemming
from the reinvigoration of § 1983 and from the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it has been argued, was a significant reason for the
turn against litigation in the federal courts. 20 1 The phenomenon of
constriction, of which the evolution of interlocutory appeals in
governmental immunity cases is a part, dates from the late 1970s when
the increase in federal court filings began. 202
Interlocutory appeals similarly expanded in reaction to the
growth of litigation permitted by the class action rule, which was
amended in 1966, and the concomitant rise in other forms of aggregate
litigation. The proliferation of interlocutory appeals in complex
litigation has been both statutory and rule based. As we have seen, the
Supreme Court initially rejected interlocutory appeals from class
certification determinations. 2 0 3 In Coopers & Lybrand, decided in 1978,
the issue was presented on a plaintiffs motion. 204 Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous court, weighed the costs and benefits of
interlocutory appeals. He noted that certification denial may end
litigation in small claims class actions, and that "allowing an immediate
appeal from those orders may enhance the quality of justice afforded a
few litigants." 205 Nevertheless "this incremental benefit is outweighed

198. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (upholding use of § 1983 in civil suit to vindicate
a Fourth Amendment violation by state police officers); see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 9 (3d ed. 2013) ("Before Monroe v. Pape,

§

1983

was remarkable for its insignificance.").
199. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (establishing doctrine of qualified immunity
by that name); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (upholding good faith and probable cause
defense to

§

1983 case).

200. "[T]he Harlow Court refashioned the qualified immunity doctrine" in such a way as to
"permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at
526 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
201. See Subrin & Main, supra note 16, at 1861-67 (arguing that judges used procedural rules
to "take control" of litigation through case management).
202. See Spencer, supra note 16, at 356 (discussing the valence of procedural change towards
restricting access to merits determinations).

203. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 463 (1978).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 473.
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by the impact of such an individualized jurisdictional inquiry on the
judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice." 20 6 Neither the
argument that denial of class certification represented a "death knell"
to the class action because no action would be brought at all if small
claims could not be aggregated, nor the idea that class action
certification decisions were unrelated to the merits, convinced the Court
otherwise. 207
An influential decision from the Seventh Circuit in 1995, voicing
concern about the pressure to settle that class certification imposed on
defendants, changed the conversation. 2 0 8 In 1998, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended to include an interlocutory appeal of
class action certification decisions. 209 This rule is the only time to date
that the civil rulemakers have exercised their power to make appellate
rules. 210 The remaining interlocutory appeals in the complex litigation
context have been legislatively created and focused on supporting the
federal courts' expanded exercise of jurisdiction. In expanding diversity
jurisdiction over some mass torts in 2002, Congress provided for
interlocutory appeals. 211 Similarly, in expanding diversity jurisdiction
over class actions in 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act allowed
interlocutory appeals of remand orders so that defendants facing
remand of class actions to state courts could appeal immediately.212
The final category of interlocutory appeals is appellate
mandamus. This form of interlocutory appeal has been read into the All
Writs Act, 213 providing that the federal courts "may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 2 14 The availability of
appellate mandamus was first recognized in 1957 in a dispute over the
use of a special master in a set of antitrust cases. 215 The Supreme

206. Id. This rationale was reaffirmed recently. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1707
(2017).
207. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 470.
208. That decision was In re Rhone-PoulencRorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294, 1298-99 (7th Cir.
1995), which granted a writ of mandamus on class certification and explained that the pressure to
settle as a result of even a small risk of massive liability renders the certification decision
effectively unappealable. Klonoff, supra note 121, at 739 ("It was not until 1995, however, with the
decision in Rhone-Poulenc, that the Committee focused extensively on such an amendment to Rule
23.").
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2012) (interlocutory appeals); Steinman, supra note 167, at 1238.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(3) (providing for appeals from remand orders).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (providing for appeals from remand orders).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Steinman, supra note 167, at 1258-72 (analyzing the doctrine of
appellate mandamus).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
215. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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Court's support for appellate mandamus has waxed and waned over the
years, and the availability of this form of interlocutory appeal is
discretionary and fact specific. 216 The Court has stated that appellate
mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy" only available in cases of
"judicial 'usurpation of power' or a 'clear abuse of discretion.' "217 But
the flexibility of this vehicle for appeal is such that it can encompass
any order issued by a district court, including discovery orders.
Some argue that the doctrines expanding appellate jurisdiction
are a response to shifts in civil litigation, especially the shift from trial
to motion practice. 218 The Courts of Appeals have developed a series of
doctrines allowing appeals from motions so that they can control
outcomes before judgment because motion practice rather than trial is
the location of meaningful decisions. There are certainly some indicia
of this in complex litigation, where the increase in appellate
intervention has largely been a method of limiting the availability of
the class action device. 219 The dynamics of settlement have been
particularly important to the development of interlocutory appeals in
class actions. 22 0 Increased concern about the way that motions affect
settlement leverage-the "blackmail" thesis- ncouraged expansion of
appellate jurisdiction. The rationale for interlocutory appeals for
immunities sounds a similar note; the concern there is that defendants
not be exposed to the risk and cost of litigation, which must be policed
in an ongoing manner.
Regardless of the reason or the policy soundness of interlocutory
appeals in discrete substantive areas, their growth threatens "litigation
coherence." 22 1 Civil rights cases can find themselves travelling up and

216. Steinman notes that "the Supreme Court had never endorsed appellate mandamus as a
means of interlocutory review by the federal courts of appeals." Steinman, supranote 167, at 125960. For example, in 1964, the Court approved an interlocutory appeal for physical examinations
under Rule 35. Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109 (1964). But inKerr v. U.S. District Court,
426 U.S. 394, 395-99 (1976), the Court disapproved of an appellate mandamus in a case involving
discovery of prison personnel records, and in Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 379-80
(2004), the Supreme Court approved of an appellate mandamus relating to discovery sought by
the Vice President.
217. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380.
218. "As the center of litigation moves further out of their reach, appellate courts will
sporadically try to regain the level of control they exercised at the turn of this century." Yeazell,
supranote 170, at 664.
219. Klonoff, supra note 121, at 739.
220. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986, 993 (5th Cir. 2015) (permitting
interlocutory appeal of administration of class action settlement agreement).
221. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 315 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Taken together,
these requirements, as set forth in the Court's cases, help pick out a class of orders where the
error-correcting benefits of immediate appeal likely outweigh the costs, delays, diminished
litigation coherence, and waste of appellate court time potentially associated with multiple
appeals.").
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down the appellate ladder several times. 222 Increasingly, this has been
the case with all class actions. 223 In sum, appeals need not any longer
come at the end of the suit, following a final judgment, but can be filed
any time at the court's discretion.
F. Some Counterexamples

-

Before turning to the significance of the disintegration of
procedural order described so far, it is important to note some contrary
evidence. The most obvious example of a traditional motion that comes
out of sequence is the motion for a preliminary injunction, which asks
the judge to hold a hearing and determine the likelihood of success on
the merits-a determination which often is the "whole ball game" 2 2 4
at the commencement of litigation. The preliminary injunction,
however, is widely understood as an "extraordinary" 2 2 5 remedy, a
departure from the usual rule of determination of relief after the merits
which requires significant justification. (Even if, perhaps, this is not the
case in fact.) In that sense, it is more like a writ of mandamus in the
appellate context. That exigent circumstances were required for a
preliminary injunction supports the view that in the run of cases civil
procedure embraced the textbook sequence.
We have also seen that the rules have always stated that
summary judgment motions can be brought at any time until thirty
days after the close of discovery, and, since 1948, motions to dismiss
have been able to be converted into summary judgment motions to
facilitate decision at the commencement of the lawsuit. There are surely
other long-standing exceptions to the textbook order of how a case is to
proceed. For the most part, however, until the 1980s these were
understood to be exceptional deviations from a regular order, rather
than items on an A la carte menu of procedural tools without sequential
order.
By contrast, the courts have actively considered sequencing in
the context of jurisdictional motions brought at the start of a lawsuit.
For example, if a defendant brings a motion to dismiss based on lack of
standing and lack of personal jurisdiction, which motion should come
222. Id. at 321.
223. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) (remanding class
certification); Klonoff, supra note 121, at 731 (noting rise of "potential impediments to class
certification"); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 790 (2016)
(describing a new era of restrictions on public interest class actions). See generally Maureen
Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843 (2016) (arguing that backlash against aggregatedamages class actions has detrimentally impacted other forms of class actions).
224. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008).
225. Id. at 24.
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first? 2 2 6 What is more, the judicial and statutory approach to diversity

jurisdiction generally deviates from the trend towards the decline of the
textbook sequence. For example, if the plaintiffs recovery is below the
amount in controversy requirement in a diversity case, the statute
provides that the court may award costs but not dismiss for want of
jurisdiction. 2 2 7
Despite these counterexamples, the general trend has been the
disintegration of the sequential order. The following Part suggests some
explanations for this change. Understanding the reasons for these
developments is necessary to analyze what procedural design the
federal courts ought to adopt, because any procedural design must
match the needs of the administration of justice to succeed.
II. REASONS FOR DISINTEGRATION
The Supreme Court has stated that "no adjudicative system can
function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings," 2 28 and yet this Article has described a
disorder in federal procedural law. This Part explores the explanations
for the decline of the textbook order. Understanding the reasons for
disintegration is crucial to formulating a path forward.
There are four interrelated reasons for the disintegration of
procedure. The connecting thread between them is judicial discretion.
The structure of the Federal Rules provides a default sequence of
motions within which judges have significant discretion. The first
reason for disintegration is that judges have exercised their discretion
to alter the order of procedure in response to substantive concerns in
civil rights, prisoner, mass tort, antitrust, and consumer class action
litigation, although the federal courts have not systematized these
changes or made them explicit. Second, these same substantive
concerns have led to increased judicial focus on case disposition, and
especially on culling cases as early as possible in the litigation process,
which has upended the textbook sequence of motions because the
textbook sequence favors culling later in the process. Third, concerns at
the appellate level regarding the untethered exercise of discretion by
district courts and the desire to exercise control over pretrial motions
have led appellate judges to alter the textbook order to facilitate
appellate review. Fourth, judges making procedural law often seem to
226. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (holding that the
district court may consider a personal jurisdiction motion before subject matter jurisdiction);
Clermont, supra note 4, at 21-24 (discussing motion order and analyzing cases).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (2012).
228. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).
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be unaware of the effect of their decisions on other areas of the
procedural law or unwilling to take systemic effects into account. This
lack of coordination also contributes to upending the textbook order.
A. Judicial Discretionand the Substantive Law
Rule 1 explains that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts." 2 2 9
Charles Clark, the architect of the Federal Rules, promised a simple set
of rules that would be applicable across all cases and would solve some
of the problems associated with the Field Code and previous procedural
regimes, which were perceived by many as too technical and imposing
unnecessary barriers to just merits determinations. 2 3 0 The Federal
Rules no longer look so simple.
The problem with Clark's approach was that cases can be very
different from one another, from the number of parties, to the stakes of
the case, to the complexity of the evidentiary and legal questions raised.
Differences among cases pose a problem for a set of rules meant to
govern all cases. Complexity is not evenly distributed across subject
matter, so that, for example, an antitrust case will present procedural
difficulties different from a contract action. The Federal Rules' broad
approach to joinder of claims and parties exacerbates this problem. It
was solved by permitting broad judicial discretion to apply the rules as
warranted by the circumstances. The soul of the Federal Rules, it might
be said, is judicial discretion, and discretion may be the price for their
(relative)

simplicity. 2 3 1

Indeed,

the

rules bear

within them

the

"elemental rust" of discretion, and the result has been disintegration. 232
There is a tension between the norm of consistency, that is, the
idea that the rules are applicable to all cases regardless of subject
matter, and the reality of judicial discretion in rule application, which
permits judges to treat different substantive areas of the law
differently.233 The existence of the rules and related statutes governing

229. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
230. See Subrin, supra note 130, at 937-46 (describing complaints about the civil justice
system from the 1800s through the early twentieth century); id. at 964 (describing Clark's
preference for discretion in rulemaking).
231. On the multiple meanings of discretion,

see RONALD DWORKIN,

TAING RIGHTS

SERIOUSLY 48-51 (Bloomsbury Acad. 2013) (1977). Federal judges making procedural decisions
are bound by case law as well as the general principle that the rules be interpreted to "secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," FED. R. CIV. P. 1, but there is a great
deal of play in the joints.
232. DICKINSON, supra note 7.

233. See William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
386-410 (2001) (discussing the different ways courts interpret Rule 23 for securities as opposed to
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all cases creates the appearance of consistency across cases, although
in fact the rules are not always applied consistently across or even
within a given subject matter. The tension between the systemic
structure, which promises uniform order, and the discretion in
individual cases, which results in disorder, is exposed in the doctrines
discussed so far in this Article. In each of the examples discussed,
judicial responses to substantive problems-responses that were
permitted by the discretionary application of the overarching rulesresulted in disorganization. Standing doctrine evolved in response to
public law cases under the APA; the standards for motions to dismiss,
class certification, and interlocutory appeals evolved in response to
complex and civil rights litigation.
Doctrinal changes driven by substantive concerns sometimes
migrate to other substantive areas. Even in cases where the doctrines
altering the order of proceedings have remained siloed, the possibility
of such migration remains alive because the exercise of judicial
discretion so readily permits it. For example, the Supreme Court did not
limit the plausibility pleading standard, 234 but instead specifically
explained that it was universally applicable and stated that to rule
otherwise would be "incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 235 A similar phenomenon is seen in the development of the
injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine, which may have begun
in the administrative law realm but is now routinely applied to every
case.236
In sum, disintegration is in part the result of the use of judicial
discretion to tailor procedures to solve problems presented in specific
substantive contexts, but the norm of procedural consistency across
cases means that it is not always limited to those contexts.
B. Culling Cases
A second reason for disintegration is the desire to cull cases
earlier in the litigation either in specific subject areas or across the

mass torts class actions, differences which are attributable to the subject matter and not to
doctrinal requirements).
234. For example, the Supreme Court originally rejected special pleading for civil rights cases.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002) (holding that a federal court may not
apply a heightened pleading standard to Title VII cases); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1993) (holding that a federal court may
not apply a heightened pleading standard to civil rights cases brought under § 1983).
235. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
236. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (applying injury-in-fact
requirement in statutory damages case); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-90 (2014) (applying to allegations of lost sales).
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board. Culling was a judicial response to the general perception of a
"litigation explosion." 237 That perception was, in turn, a product of the
increase in federal causes of action created in the 1960s and 70s,
although many perceived the change not as due to a rise in causes of
action, but rather due to an increase in litigiousness in American
society and a concomitant increase in meritless suits. 2 38 Concerns about
meritless litigation led to greater judicial focus on distinguishing the
wheat from the chaff earlier than the textbook sequence dictated. It also
led to greater emphasis on settlement over adjudication. This approach
can be contrasted with the emphasis on developing information for
merits determinations, a key feature of the textbook order.239
Plausibility pleading, Lone Pine orders accompanying motions
to dismiss, minitrials at class action certification hearings, and
summary judgment motions in which the defendant merely points to
the plaintiffs lack of evidence are all innovations aimed at culling cases,
preferably as early as possible in the litigation. The enlargement of
federal jurisdiction over class actions was driven by a similar rationale
based in the belief that federal judges are better able to distinguish the
meritorious from the meritless suits than state judges. Under these
rules, if at the start of the case the plaintiff lacks the necessary
information to maintain her suit prior to discovery, she may find her
case dismissed or lose on summary judgment. The structure has the
effect of suppressing information and promoting settlement more often
than rectitude. Standing doctrine is the outlier here, in that it upends
the order of litigation by requiring more information than would
ordinarily be available at the start of the litigation. It is therefore open
to being decided at any time, even after significant costs have already
been incurred. These changes were largely directed at winnowing cases
in particular subject areas, which happen to be those that saw increased
filings in the latter quarter of the twentieth century: mass torts, civil
rights, public law litigation under the APA, and consumer class
actions.240

237. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1992).

238. See generally Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
239. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at ProceduralDiscretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 1972-73 (2007) (noting that the main focus of the judicial role under the rules
promulgated in 1938 was trying cases rather than actively managing the process of litigation).
240. Whether there is in fact a lot of meritless litigation in these categories is disputed. There
are anecdotes on both sides, but little data. See Sachin S. Pandya & Peter Siegelman,
Underclaimingand Overclaiming, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 836 (2013).
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Balancing early dismissal with the need for information to
decide cases accurately presents some difficulty. 241 But the desire to cull
cases early on need not lead to the kind of disorder that has evolved in
the procedural law. The sequence imagined by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-from ease of pleadings to discovery to summary
judgment or trial-privileged information production and truth seeking
over early (and inexpensive) determinations. One could instead have an
orderly regime that emphasizes early case evaluation over truth
seeking and resolution on the merits. The common law writ system
provides such an example; it was an orderly system designed to dismiss
cases with minimal information. 242 I do not mean to imply that the writ
system was a good approach to procedural design; it was too rigid and
allowed too many cases to be determined on technicalities rather than
the merits. 243 The contrast between the writ system and the textbook
order demonstrates the import of procedural design to outcomes.
C. Appellate Control
A third reason for disintegration is the courts of appeals' desire
for control. The increased availability of appellate review before
judgment has been driven by a perceived need for better control over
judicial discretion at the district court level and is part of the larger
emphasis on dispositive motions and the trend towards dismissing
lawsuits early.
In the early 1980s, Judge Friendly argued that greater appellate
review was necessary to assure consistency across cases, especially as
the federal system grew in size. 2 4 4 Perhaps appellate judges reached
this conclusion after they realized that the structure of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure brought fewer decisions up for their review
than previous procedural systems did. 2 4 5 While interlocutory review is
an attractive method for controlling the discretion of district court
judges, it is difficult to implement in a regime that as a matter of

241. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 1271.
242. In the common law system, there was no discovery or motion practice to speak of and
cases were either screened early or they went to trial. Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of
the Civil ProcedureCourse: A Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397, 407, 412 (1998).
243. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989) ("Formulation of new theories of
legal rights is simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in
terms of old legal categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading.").
244. See Henry J. Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
245. See Yeazell, supranote 170, at 664.
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doctrine grants judges broad discretion in decisionmaking, especially
when that determination is fact based.246
Sometimes the introduction of interlocutory review has been
substance specific, creating standards that can be consistently applied
in all cases in one area of law. Qualified immunity appeals are an
example of this. The Supreme Court has held that suits against public
officials should be evaluated early on so that government officials are
not distracted from their work by litigation. 247 A similar rationale is
behind the increased availability of interlocutory appellate review of
class action certification, as well as interlocutory review of subject
matter jurisdiction over class actions and mass torts. In class
certification, for example, Rule 23(f) addressed the concern that without
interlocutory review defendants will feel undue pressure to settle even
nonmeritorious cases or will be burdened with unnecessary costs of
litigation that will make it harder for them to stay in business.
Those cases which single out a specific type of suit for regular
appellate review represent not so much disorder as a new order: an
order based on the substantive legal issues triggering different sets of
procedures. Once the differences among types of cases are catalogued,
the sequence to be followed in each substantive category of cases
becomes clear. To reveal the order, what is needed is to shift one's focus
from procedure to substance. This shift in procedural design in turn
requires substantive justifications for different treatment, such as
special solicitude for governmental officers. It also requires reasoned
consideration of related rules affected by the changing procedural
design because the entire system is interconnected.
At other times the introduction of interlocutory appeals has been
less targeted. Appellate judges have transformed what ordinarily would
be questions of the application of law to fact into pure legal questions to
enable interlocutory appeals from summary judgment decisions in
cases as varied as mass torts, antitrust, and civil rights. 248 For these
cases, the push for greater control over district court decisionmakingostensibly to promote consistency-has led to greater incoherence in
appellate jurisdiction.
246. For example, a regime of heavy appellate review is not consistent with the standards
applicable to discovery, which is a good explanation for the denial of interlocutory appeals from
discovery determinations. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009)
(declining to grant interlocutory review to a district court ruling regarding the attorney-client
privilege). But such appeals are sometimes granted. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
379-80 (2004).
247. See supra Section I.D (discussing qualified immunity).
248. See Wolff, supranote 159, at 1357-58. This is not only true in qualified immunity cases.
Requiring an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence, as in cases like Matsushitaand Celotex,

similarly turns a question of the application of fact to law into a pure question of law.
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For the most part, the policy of heightened review and the
disruption it causes to litigation coherence has been insufficiently
justified. What differences among cases justify interlocutory review?
What empirical support, if any, is needed to justify this divergence?
How ought the tension between the litigant's need to obtain resolution
while facts are still relatively fresh in witnesses' minds and the desire
for appellate control of district court decisionmaking be resolved in
particular areas of the law? There is little evidence that courts have
given any consideration to these trade-offs. 249 Instead, the decisions
seem ad hoc, responsive to the felt needs of the individual case rather
than the system as a whole, and not reliant on any empirical data.
D. Lack of Systemic Coordination
A final reason for disintegration is that judges making
procedural law in individual cases are poorly positioned to consider the
systemic effect of their decisions. Indeed, judicial opinions rarely
demonstrate awareness of the effects of the decision on other areas of
the procedural law. The results of decisions attempting to mold the
procedural law to the perceived need to cull certain types of lawsuits, to
increase appellate control, or simply to create a procedure more suited
to requirements of the substantive law reverberate through the
system. 2 50 This phenomenon is the product of what Mirjan Damaska, in
his comparative study of procedural systems, called a "coordinate"
system as distinct from a "hierarchical" one. 2 5 1 That is, in the federal
procedural system "what appears to be the best solution in a particular
case will not be readily sacrificed to certainty and uniformity in
decisionmaking." 252 This is a structural feature of procedural law,
expressed in the devolution of sequencing to the district court level.
Consider standing doctrine. In the development of the injury-infact rule to cabin the types of public law cases that Article III courts
were required to hear, there is no evidence that the Supreme Court
249. Except perhaps in dissent. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1996) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
250. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2113 (1989):
[T]he steps in a developed procedural system are interrelated. Early steps in the process
rest on anticipation of what is to come, and later steps clearly flow from preceding
ones.... After commencing down a trail to substantive variations in rules, Congress

would find it hard to stop short of complete differentiation that would seriously
complicate federal court practice in the manner that the common law procedure did.
251. Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative CriminalProcedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480, 509 (1975).
252. Id.
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considered the inefficiencies of deciding standing later in the litigation,
including at trial, or the relationship between a standing inquiry that
follows trial and preclusion doctrine. Similarly, there is no evidence
that in articulating a new factual standard for pleadings the Supreme
Court considered the relationship between Rule 8, which provides that
the pleader must show that she is entitled to relief, with Rule 9, which
states that conditions of mind may be alleged generally, or Rule 11,
which provides that parties may plead on information and belief. 253 In
class certification, as well, there is little evidence that courts have
considered what effect conducting nonbinding merits determinations
that approximate trials at the class certification stage will have further
along in the litigation process. In the case of class actions there is a
practical explanation for the lack of attention: settlement in class
actions appears inevitable. But if a case does not settle, then the court
will duplicate at trial the work it already did at the certification stage.
This may become a bigger problem, as there is some evidence that more
class actions are going to trial. 2 5 4 Furthermore, there is no evidence
that, in creating and expanding the collateral order doctrine to exercise
more control over judicial discretion in complex litigation and civil
rights, the appellate courts meant to encourage litigation over the
availability of interlocutory appeals in other substantive areas. There
is one important exception: jurisdictional sequencing at the motion to
dismiss stage has been explicitly considered by the courts in a
thoughtful manner.255
This raises a question of institutional competence. In several
instances, the Supreme Court has not adequately considered the
existing procedural design in its decisions, which appear to be
piecemeal reactions to the problems posed by the individual case.
Although many doctrines affecting the entire procedural system have
always been judge made, from standing to preclusion, changes to the
procedural law in the last thirty-five years do not inspire confidence in
the courts' capacity to think about procedural design holistically. Courts
must pay greater attention to the systemic effects of procedural
decisions across the board and make clear when such decisions are
substance specific and when it is sensible to export them from their
doctrinal silos. This means considering not only the effect of a rule
change on different types of cases, but the effect of that change on the
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (claim for relief); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (pleading conditions of the
mind); FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(3) (representations to the court).
254. See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569,
1641-50 (2016).
255. For an analysis of these decisions and their effect on preclusion, see Clermont, supra note
4, at 24.
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operation of the other rules in the system. Appellate courts, including
the Supreme Court, could benefit from input from the Civil Rules
Committee as they consider such changes in the context of an individual
case.256

At the district court level, tailoring the procedural order requires
the judge to possess a great deal of information both about the case
before her and about the run of similar cases. Steven Gensler and Judge
Lee Rosenthal explain that "[o]nly a sufficient amount of good and
reliable information from the parties will accurately identify the real
and important issues in the case and the best ways to investigate and
resolve them." 2 5 7 Obtaining this information is costly, sometimes even
impossible. Information costs are usually associated with the process of
discovery, but obtaining the information the judge needs to decide the
sequence of motions also imposes costs which would be borne by both
judge and parties, except for the fact that by all reports this information
is rarely elicited. "Too often there is no serious discussion about what
motions might be filed. Too often there is no serious discussion about
the sequence or timing of any contemplated motions. And too often
there is no serious discussion about the relationship between those
motions and discovery." 258 Because of the information costs of creating
a bespoke procedural sequence, judges fail to coordinate within the case
as well as across cases.
There is good reason to predict that devolving rulemaking to
individual federal judges in individual cases will lead to disintegration,
because these judges, making sequencing decisions in the moment, are
not well placed to think about the effects of their individual decisions
on the entire system. A decision about procedural order should be
justified with reference to the systemic benefits of that rule across
cases, and this is difficult to do with the information provided in any
single case. Predicting the effects of procedural change in the case
before them on the system is challenging because it requires thinking
through the interplay between the rules and what other judges might
do. Individual judges are also in a poor position to evaluate the
antecedent substantive legal regime to which a given procedure applies,
especially given the type of information they can obtain from the
litigants before them to assist them in this evaluation. For these
institutional reasons, many scholars have expressed skepticism as to

256. See Scott Dodson, Should the Rules Committee Have an Amicus Role?, 104 VA. L. REV. 1
(2018).
257. Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 517, 520 (2012).
258. Id. at 528.
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the ability of judges to make determinations about sequencing on an ad
hoc basis.

259

There is little evidence that the legislative branch is better
suited than the courts to making such determinations, at least without
expert assistance. The various rules of civil procedure and the
procedural law are interrelated. Experts in the structure of the
procedural rules are more likely to see these interrelationships and the
effects of one rule change on other rules than congressional staffers who
are unfamiliar with the procedural system or lobbyists with their own
interests. 260 Furthermore, some doctrines (such as Article III standing)
are outside congressional control.
In sum, disintegration has been the result of several
developments that are all bottomed on the judicial discretion made
possible by the Federal Rules themselves. Discretion permits judges to
adjust the sequence of motions to address perceived problems in certain
substantive areas and to adjust the standards for those motions, which
in turn upends the relationship between motions and discovery. The
exercise of individual discretion has spurred increased appellate control
as well as decreased coordination. Since the very beginning the Federal
Rules have had the possibility of upending the order they set out, but
the process of decay became much more significant over time.
III. OPTIMAL PROCEDURAL DESIGN
So far I have described a procedural system in which judges may,
at their discretion, alter the sequence of motions rather than having the
sequence of motions correspond to the textbook order. These changes
ought to spur renewed discussion about procedural design. This Part
considers three approaches to procedural design: sequential ordering,
bespoke procedure, and substance-specific procedure. It evaluates each
of them in light of the admonition of due process that the litigant is
entitled to "notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it,"261
as well as the stated goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "to
259. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 889, 900 (2009) (questioning the capacity of district judges to adequately
analyze the optimal pleading rule in a given case); Kaplow, supra note 4, at 1271 (same); David
Marcus, Trans-substantivityand the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1195,
1223 (discussing the difficulties judges face in crafting substance-specific procedure and defending
the norm of trans-substantivity).
260. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the InsideAn Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013) (an empirical study of legislators' understanding of methods of statutory
interpretation used by the courts showing the knowledge gap between legislators and courts).
261. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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determination of every

action." 262

The underlying principle of this discussion, and indeed the
important contribution of this Part of the Article, is that individuals
need to know both what the order of the procedural law is and how it is
justified so they can contest that sequence. Because procedures can
determine outcomes, it is particularly important that they are
contestable. 263 That contestation requires a theory of procedural design.
This Part presents alternative designs and demonstrates how they
might be contested based on their ability to realize procedural goals.
There are several potential goals for a procedural regime. 264 For
the sake of framing the debate, I consider the goals articulated by the
governing law on procedural design: the due process clauses and Rule
1.265 These legal sources are both incomplete and capacious, open to a
wide range of interpretation which can change over time. One might
well quarrel with the goals chosen here and pick other ones to replace
or to enhance them. One might also correctly point out that these goals
could support many different approaches to procedural design. The
point is not to provide the definitive argument for what goals a
procedural system should meet, something that merits book-length
treatment, but rather to illustrate the application of judicially
recognized goals to the procedural designs on the table. This discussion
is meant to illustrate how the potential procedural regimes laid out may
be analyzed, picking values that have been shown to garner some
agreement in the courts in principle, if not application, with the
understanding that this is the beginning of the conversation.
A. The Goals of ProceduralDesign
Drawing on Rule 1, I evaluate the procedural design based on
four goals: (1) whether the procedural design provides for a meaningful
hearing, (2) how likely it is to achieve a just resolution of the dispute,

262. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
263. See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in
DEMOCRACY'S VALUE 163 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999) (discussing the
ability to contest laws and policies as a democratic norm).
264. See supranote 13 (listing sources discussing procedural values).
265. FED. R. CIv. P. 1. Due process requires that individuals have notice and the right to be
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)).
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(3) the likely speed of resolution, and (4) whether it achieves justice and
speed while minimizing cost. 2 6 6

A meaningful hearing is one in which the litigant has an
opportunity to present her case before an impartial judge who will treat
her with equal concern and respect. Due process requires little more; it
does not, for example, require an appeal. 267 But implied in the idea of a
meaningful opportunity to present one's case is that one must have
access to sufficient information to adequately present that case and
access to a judge who is open minded to that presentation. 2 6 8 One
complaint of the writ system was that it denied a meaningful hearing,
disposing of cases on technicalities. The need for information brings us
to the question of the relationship between two additional goals of
procedural design: accuracy and the merits.
A second goal of procedural design is to attempt to provide a just
determination of the action on the merits. Justice in this context can
mean a variety of things. Here I define a just determination to be one
that correctly applies the law to the facts of the case. This means that
the litigants and the judge must have access to those facts relevant to
making a decision. It does not mean, however, that the resolution must
be correct every time. There is no system in which a decisionmaker is
always correct, and even if it were a possibility the likelihood is that the
costs would greatly exceed the benefits. 269 Accordingly, the procedural
rules must promote accuracy such that the case has a fair chance of
reaching the correct result. 2 7 0 It is difficult to quantify what that
probability must be, and I will not try to do so here.
A third goal is that the determination be relatively expeditious.
This requirement recognizes that a decision may be correct but if
rendered too late may be of little use to the litigant. 271 In some cases,
gathering information and producing legal arguments to reach a correct

266. All of these might be put under the general heading of efficiency-that is, a procedural
law that is structured to maximize social welfare by taking into account the costs of the system as
against the system's effect on primary behavior. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 1187.
267. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (stating that "the right to a
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice").
268. See Lahav, supra note 13, at 1667-68 (discussing the importance of equal concern and
respect of litigants); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values ofProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (arguing that the core of due process
is adjudicatory independence).
269. Furthermore, the correct application of law to facts is often contested; that is why a
lawsuit is filed in the first place. This makes measuring accuracy difficult.
270. See Bone, supra note 239, at 1981-84 (discussing accuracy as a probabilistic concept).
271. See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure:The Casefor Commuting
CorrectJudgments for Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1994) (arguing in favor
of a regime that privileges speed over accuracy).
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result takes time, and so speed must sometimes be traded off against
accuracy.
The fourth and final goal is that the procedural design should be
alert to balancing these values with the costs of procedure. Costs can be
defined in a variety of ways. For example, this could simply mean the
lay definition of the term, which is to say that the goals of accuracy and
speed should be met with a minimum of waste. Other costs to be
considered include planning costs. A system ought to provide a
sufficiently predictable order so that the litigants can estimate the cost
of suit in advance, so that they can calculate the economic benefit of
filing at all, settling the case, or proceeding through each phase of
litigation. If litigants are risk averse, uncertainty, including
uncertainty of procedural ordering, is a cost.
Each of these goals require trade-offs. Likely, the court system
must balance the goal of accuracy with those of relative cost and speed.
For example, even if a system that promised one hundred percent
accuracy was possible, it would likely be too costly given what is at stake
in the case. A system may move cases to resolution relatively quickly
but require a significant investment in resources to do so accurately, an
investment that is greater than the social value of the additional speed
or even of the case itself.
B. Three ProceduralDesigns
Having briefly described some basic goals for a procedural
regime, I now turn to evaluating three potential procedural designs
with attention to those goals. The analysis here is not meant to be
definitive, but instead to frame the discussion for reconsidering the
sequence of motions in civil litigation. The basic observation is that
there are levels of standardization available, and the choice between a
stronger or weaker default organization of procedure has consequences
for the operation of the court system and its ability to realize the values
described above.
1. Default Sequential Ordering
As described earlier, the textbook order of civil procedure is
characterized by a sequential order of motions that are calibrated to the
information available at the stage of the litigation in which they are
brought. This order proceeds as follows, although not every case must
go through all the steps: filing, motion to dismiss or answer, discovery,
summary judgment, trial, and finally, appeal. Motions at the start of
the litigation, when little exchange of information has occurred, are
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focused on legal standards. As the lawsuit proceeds through discovery
and the parties have had the opportunity to develop facts, the motions
may consider more factual issues and go to the merits, which may be
determined at summary judgment or trial.
Because the textbook order calibrates the nature of the motion
on the continuum of pure law to application of the law to the facts of the
case based on the expected information available to the parties at each
stage, it meets the due process requirement of providing a meaningful
hearing. It also promotes accuracy of decisionmaking, as it puts a
premium on the relationship between information access and motion
structure. When the motion standard does not fit the information
available, however, such as with the current standard for motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim or motions to dismiss on standing
grounds, the sequence seems out of step with the informational
requirements of the motions and risks neglecting the requirement of a
meaningful hearing because of the informational barriers. Such
doctrines require a different sequence of motions than that dictated by
the textbook order. In the examples above, an appropriate sequence
would interpose some targeted discovery prior to a motion to dismiss.
The textbook order is intended to facilitate a cumulative
determination of the case rather than discontinuous determinations. 2 7 2
By this I mean that the gathering of information and motion practice is
supposed to lead up to a trial (or more likely, a summary judgment
motion) that determines the case in a single episode. The assumption
that a proceeding ought to be cumulative and that the pretrial phase is
intended to prepare for this determinative moment is what drove the
idea that appeals should follow final judgment, and it is the assumption
behind the argument, articulated by Justice Frankfurter, that the
"momentum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the
component elements in a unified cause." 273 It is also the idea behind
Justice Breyer's more recent expression of concern about "litigation
coherence." 274
By contrast, discontinuous determinations involve deciding the
issues in piecemeal hearings. It may be more practical in some cases to
isolate dispositive issues and adopt the more discontinuous approach of
serial factual evaluations. For example, suppose that it is possible to
determine a core issue that will end the case-say that the statute of
limitations has expired-at the start of the litigation. The parties have
272. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure:Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME

L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1988).
273. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
274. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 315 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sufficient information to prove this fact. Still, it cannot be decided on a
motion to dismiss because the determination requires some facts, and
on a motion to dismiss the court is limited by the content of the
complaint. It would be accurate and appropriate to determine the
statute of limitations question right at the start of the lawsuit, based
on affidavits, on a motion for summary judgment. The rules permit
this. 2 7 5
Without a doubt a summary judgment motion would be a more
accurate, cost effective, and speedy way to resolve the case than the
alternative of going through the entire discovery process. The problem
is that a motion for summary judgment prior to discovery does not
correspond with the textbook sequence. In such a case the textbook
order would be too rigid. This example illustrates that any adherent of
the textbook order would still want the possibility of taking some
decisions out of order to facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of the case. Some flexibility of sequencing to meet the
needs of the case is necessary in any procedural design. The difficulty
is where to draw the line so that the exception does not become the rule.
The statute of limitations example provides an easy case.
Statutes of limitations questions are able to be neatly separated from
the remainder of the lawsuit and can allow the court to determine the
claim or even the entire suit on one motion, saving both time and effort.
The picture becomes more complex when the motion proposed is linked
to other legal and factual issues raised in the case and not dispositive
of the entire case or even the entire claim. For example, suppose that a
defendant seeks early determination of one key issue (but one that does
not resolve the action entirely) and that the discovery of information
necessary to resolve that issue overlaps with information that will be
needed later to resolve other issues. Further, suppose that a database
would be searched for one piece of information in the initial motion and
then would need to be searched again for subsequent motions. 27 6 It
would not be efficient to provide access to information in this
discontinuous way and would better serve the court and parties to
complete the entirety of discovery with respect to that database at once,
and use that information to resolve the issues in the case to which it is
relevant.

275. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings).
276. I am grateful to Judge Rosenthal for this example, which echoes reports from class action
lawyers stating that judges sometimes bifurcate class and merits discovery with a similar wasteful
result.

2018]

PROCEDURAL DESIGN

875

2. Bespoke Procedure
If the sequential order sometimes seems too rigid, bespoke
procedure suffers from the opposite problem: it is so flexible that it
appears to have no backbone at all. Under a bespoke procedure, the
judge evaluates the case and determines which sequence of motions is
best suited to the case before her. The order of motions is discontinuous.
Rather than following a sequence which builds up to a trial at which
the decisionmaker determines all or most of the issues presented in the
case, the judge determines issues in the order that is best calculated to
get to the heart of the matter. 277 This discontinuous sequence of motions
may include, for example, multiple partial motions for summary
judgment or multiple motions to dismiss. It may include appeals of
crucial issues before trial. Whereas the sequential order focuses on the
relationship between available information and the type of motion
presented, the bespoke procedure does not have this limiting principle.
Instead it focuses on identifying the core issues of the case and deciding
what is necessary to resolve them.
If the judge can identify the core issues in the case, the result is
a more targeted resolution on the merits. For example, a bespoke
procedure can easily accommodate the summary judgment motion
based on the expiration of the statute of limitations mentioned earlier.
This form of procedural design raises three difficulties, however.
First, the judge may have difficulty identifying the core issues in the
case and therefore require repetitive or duplicative motion practice.
Second, the judge needs to obtain adequate information to determine
the core issues, which imposes greater up-front costs and increases the
risk that cognitive biases will affect decisionmaking as compared with
sequential ordering. Third, outsized dependence on judicial discretion
in sequencing increases risks of strategic behavior by the parties or
satellite litigation around the question of sequencing.
Identifying core issues. The bespoke approach to procedural
design requires the judge to take careful measure of the case before her
to determine the sequence of motions. 278 In a bespoke order there will
still be a sequence of motions, but rather than being determined in
advance by rulemakers as in the textbook order, the sequence is

277. What I describe here is similar to John Langbein's description of the German procedural
system. Drawing on earlier work by Benjamin Kaplan and Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Langbein
writes: "[T]he court ranges over the entire case, constantly looking for the jugular-for the issue
of law or fact that might dispose of the case." John H. Langbein, The GermanAdvantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830 (1985).
278. For a description of an engaged judge determining procedural order, see Steven S. Gensler
& Lee H. Rosenthal, The ReappearingJudge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849 (2013).
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determined by the judge for that individual case. The focus of this type
of order is, as noted, to identify the core issue or issues in the case and
focus pretrial motions on the determination of those issues. For this
approach to be effective, the judge and the parties must cooperate in
isolating the relevant issues and the appropriate order for their
determination. It is unlikely that the judge can do this from pleadings
or party-initiated motions alone. Accordingly, it requires heavy judicial
involvement, limitations on litigant autonomy, and significant up-front
information costs.
The risk of this approach is that the judge will err in determining
what the core issues are or that the judge will err in determining the
appropriate order of motions despite correctly identifying the core
issues. Returning to the example of the database containing
information that can be used to determine multiple issues, suppose that
the judge orders narrow discovery of a database focused on a single
issue that the judge believes will be dispositive. After discovery and
motion practice it becomes apparent that the issue will not end the case,
and the next episode in the litigation requires revisiting that same
database. This piecemeal approach will result in duplicative discovery,
increased costs, and delay of the determination of the proceedings-all
without a real corresponding benefit to the parties. The capacity of
judges to accurately determine the core issues, to be flexible when there
is no core issue or when multiple issues overlap, and to permit
cumulative determinations in those cases is crucial to a bespoke system.
This raises questions such as whether judges are capable of doing this
for every civil case that they are assigned. The concern is that, either
because of time constraints or because of the skills and judgment
required, this asks too much of judges. 279
Information costs and cognitive biases. One reason that judges
may have difficulty identifying the core issues in a case is that the
Federal Rules permit flexible joinder of both claims and parties. A case
may consist of multiple claims, and parties and issues raised by those
claims may be at the core of the case against one party but not against
the other, or core with respect to one claim but not another. To
determine the relationship between these moving parts requires
significant initial investment in information gathering and strategic
thinking about how best to organize the case. Without such initial
information gathering and development of the appropriate sequence for
that case, the likelihood of increased costs due to duplicative, repetitive,
279. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation:Judge Jack Weinstein, Creatorof Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2029-31 (1997) (describing problems with both
flexibility and rigidity in judicial decisionmaking, as well as the problem of unreviewability of
certain decisions).
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or erroneous motions is increased in comparison to a predetermined
sequence of motions that treat litigation cumulatively and combine a
number of relevant, interlacing issues. For a bespoke system to avoid
waste, the judge must be committed to an initial investment of time and
effort.
Does this mean that a bespoke system is necessarily less
efficient than a sequential order? The answer to this question can only
be determined by empirical study of like cases proceeding under
alternative regimes. It is possible that if the judge is willing to put in
the effort to determine the appropriate order and the core issues in the
beginning and to choose a sequence of motions corresponding to the
information needed to decide core issues, then the bespoke system
should be no costlier than a sequential system, and perhaps less costly
if nonessential issues are not litigated. 2 80 On the other hand, if the judge
does not invest the time or makes errors in determining the core issues,
leading either to important issues not being determined on the merits
or to duplicative or repetitive discovery or motion practice, then the
bespoke system will be less efficient. Some judges have expressed
concern that there is insufficient information gathering to determine
what motions might be filed and when, and the relationship between
those motions and discovery. 28 1 How judges will fare on average under
these demands requires further study.
Because a bespoke system imposes higher information gathering
and analysis costs on the judge at the commencement of the litigation,
it may also lead to greater effect of cognitive biases on judicial behavior
than a sequential system with a largely predetermined order. 282 Indeed,
the recognized phenomenon of individuals being blind to their own
biases is likely to make it more difficult to address these problems in a
system that determines the order of proceedings case by case. 2 83

&

280. Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 257, at 520 ("Only a sufficient amount of good and
reliable information from the parties will accurately identify the real and important issues in the
case and the best ways to investigate and resolve them.").
281. Id. at 528.
282. Judicial cognitive biases have been noted by the judiciary in the context of sentencing.
See, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 817 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing the anchoring
effect in sentencing: "[H]ad the government's initial recommendation started at a lower point,
Navarro likely would have received a lower sentence."); United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40
(2d Cir. 2013) ("When people are given an initial numerical reference, even one they know is
random, they tend (perhaps unwittingly) to 'anchor' their subsequent judgments ... to the initial
number given."); see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001) (describing experiments testing cognitive illusions among judges including anchoring bias,
framing bias, hindsight bias, egocentric bias, and the representativeness heuristic).
283. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive 'Anchoring Effect" and "BlindSpot" Biases
in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution to Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 492 (2014) (describing "blind spot" bias-that is, people's inability to perceive
their own biases-and citing sources).
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For example, if judges engage in value-motivated cognition, that
is, the tendency to privilege their own view of contested facts, they may
structure the bespoke procedure to achieve the outcome that results in
their view being vindicated. 284
Consider the majority's evaluation of the underlying facts in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a gender discrimination case in which
the Supreme Court addressed the procedural standard for certifying
class actions: "[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any
corporation-and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids
sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity
at all." 2 8 5 In this case, the Court was supposed to be evaluating the
requirement of the class action rule that class members share common
questions of law or fact, but it was doing so in light of its prior factual
assumptions about human behavior. These assumptions are disputable
and would otherwise have been the focus of the merits phase. 286
Because the order of motions and the accompanying standards applied
to determine those motions at varying stages of the litigation depend
not only on legal analysis but crucially on the relationship between law
and facts, the risk of error due to motivated cognition in developing
bespoke sequencing is significant. 287

284. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 843 (2009) (describing value-motivated
cognition as "simultaneously experienc[ing] overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the
factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and unwarranted contempt for the
perceptions associated with our opposites"). More encouragingly, a recent study has found that
professionalization limits the effects of motivated reasoning for decisions that require legal
reasoning. See Dan M. Kahan et. al., '7deology" or "Situation Sense'? An Experimental
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016).
This study raises the question of how much a very discretionary regime of procedural order
requires legal reasoning as opposed to fact evaluation. Most of the disordered motions I have
discussed involve some form of fact evaluation, even when that fact evaluation is presented under

the guise of a pure question of law. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the LawFact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003) (discussing these categories as pragmatic
rather than essential).

285. 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
286. Compare this statement with the dissent's critique: "Managers, like all humankind, may
be prey to biases of which they are unaware. The risk of discrimination is heightened when those
managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates
gender stereotypes." Id. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A similar
allegation could be made about Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009), which states that as
between an explanation for arrests of Muslim aliens based on their "potential connections to those
who committed terrorists acts" and "purposeful, invidious discrimination ... discrimination is not
a plausible conclusion."

287. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
UnchartedParallelProceduralUniverse, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 1983-84 (2004) (discussing
the relationship between exchanges of factual narratives outside litigation and through formal
procedural devices).
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Some facts will clearly dictate the ideal sequencing of
proceedings from the perspective of accuracy, speed, and cost, as in the
statute of limitations example. But often the relationship between fact
and law is more complex and subject to varying interpretationsindeed, this is likely why the case is in the courts in the first place.
Careful attention to facts and to the risk of bias can mitigate these
concerns, but that requires significantly greater judicial investment
than an off-the-shelf procedural order. For these reasons, it is possible
that a bespoke system is more prone to error than a sequential system.
The question is whether the costs of mitigating that error are greater
than the costs imposed by the relative rigidity of a sequential system.
A final note on information and error costs. In the bespoke
system, more of the costs of information forcing and strategy are borne
by the judge, who must determine and analyze information in order to
structure an appropriate procedural order for the case. By contrast, in
a sequential system, the corresponding cost of rigidity is borne by the
parties. Furthermore, one would predict that the bulk of the costs in a
textbook order are due to waste, whereas the costs of a bespoke order
are more likely to be due to error and uncertainty. If we assume that
the costs of rigidity in the sequential order are equal to the costs of error
and uncertainty in the bespoke order, we face two distinct allocation-ofcosts questions. First, is it better to have more accuracy at a somewhat
greater risk of costs imposed by rigid or unnecessary procedures?
Second, assuming no preference between the two, how are costs best
distributed as between judges and parties? This brings us to the third
challenge of a bespoke system, which is that it may increase costs by
encouraging strategic behavior and satellite litigation.
Strategic behavior and satellite litigation. Both parties and
judges engage in strategic behavior in litigation, although they are
trying to maximize different things. 288 It is well recognized that parties
engage in strategic behavior, but the idea that judges might also engage
in strategic behavior and that this creates an important litigation

&

288. On strategic behavior in litigation generally, see Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982), which
discusses the problem of distribution and utility maximization; and Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee
Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 53 (1996), which examines strategic
choices with regard to fee arrangements. Judges also engage in strategic behavior because their
interactions with parties are dynamic. See Bone, supranote 239, at 1997-2000 (illustrating how a
judge might influence litigation as a strategic player). For an overview of the literature, with a
focus on substantive law, see Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial
Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. 341 (2010).
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dynamic has not been often discussed. 28 9 For example, judges may try
to make their jurisprudential mark, avoid being overturned by
appellate courts, minimize their workload, encourage settlement, or
meet particular deadlines such as avoiding having too many motions on
the six-month list.290
In a discretionary system, parties may have an incentive to
behave strategically to manipulate the judge's choice of order, perhaps
capitalizing on their predictions of judicial incentives. A judge who fears
appellate review may be more likely to put off summary judgment
motions in § 1983 cases to encourage settlement. Knowing this to be the
case may encourage plaintiffs to press harder in discovery or defendants
to be more resistant to discovery than they would otherwise, thereby
increasing the costs of litigation to the parties. 29 1 A judge who prefers
early summary judgment motions may encourage parties to settle more
cheaply than they ought to because they lack the information necessary
to oppose the motion successfully. 2 9 2 And defendants, aware of the

expense of early summary judgment motions on the plaintiff, may
encourage the judges to permit such a motion in order to push the
plaintiff towards a lower settlement. A judge who is concerned about
managing the minitrial now required for certification of class actions
may be more inclined to encourage the parties to file dispositive motions
before class discovery and certification, even though the results will not
bind class members who might thereafter bring repetitive litigation.
The defendant may have an incentive to present the case as more
complex or raise numerous weak arguments to add to the judicial
workload to encourage such dismissal. The plaintiff may have an
incentive to do the opposite, that is, to downplay issues and present
fewer of them to encourage the judge to hold a hearing. 293
289. For an exception, see Bone, supra note 239, at 1997-2000, which asserts that the judge
is a strategic player; and Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993), which focuses on appellate judges.
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1) (2012) (requiring preparation of a semiannual report that
indicates motions that have been outstanding for more than six months). For another fascinating
example of the exercise of strategic behavior by judges, in this case coordinated at the district level,
see Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 247-84 (2016), which
describes an interpretation of procedural rules to encourage patent filings in the Eastern District
of Texas.
291. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and ConstitutionalAvoidance, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 139, 143 (arguing that the regime that allows judges to decide the order of constitutional
adjudication "invites strategic behavior by courts and litigants").
292. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 811 (empirical study finding that many
lawsuits settle without significant information).
293. Judges may also wish to settle massive numbers of suits so that they can focus their
efforts elsewhere. For a discussion of judicial interests in mass torts, see Rubenstein, supra note
233, at 427.
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The adversarial system cannot take care of the problem of
litigant strategic behavior on its own because parties are not always
evenly matched and because some parties are better placed to engage
in strategic behavior than others. 294 If the judge is bound by a
standardized procedural order, however, there are fewer opportunities
for litigants to manipulate judicial ordering of litigation to their own
ends and to the detriment of the system.
Furthermore, as these examples illustrate, parties are more
likely to dispute the judge's bespoke order when they think that they
can influence it to their own benefit, leading to satellite litigation about
the order of proceedings and diverting resources to litigating order that
might be better used to litigate the merits. On the other hand,
contestability of decisions of order is an important baseline value.
Parties should have an opportunity to dispute a bespoke order if they
think that the judge's chosen order is mistaken because it negatively
effects accuracy, speed, or cost. The risks of error and cognitive bias in
setting bespoke procedure make contestability a feature of litigating the
individual case. By contrast, in a more standardized system,
contestation occurs at the rulemaking or legislative level.
A bespoke order is more likely to attract intermediate appellate
review for these same reasons, as the appellate courts seek to impose
checks on lower court sequencing decisions. The trend towards
increasing interlocutory appeals has been attributed to the rise of
discretion, and a bespoke regime invites more regularized interlocutory
review of procedural ordering decisions. This raises again the question
of whether it is better to place the costs of control on individual litigants
and judges, or on a more standardized determination of sequencing.
3. Subject Matter Ordering
A third approach to procedural design is substance-specific
procedure. Under this regime, the procedural sequence varies by
subject matter, but in contrast to the bespoke regime it is relatively
consistent for each type of case. There are some movements in this
direction already underway in the federal courts. For example, we have
already seen the emergence of subject matter ordering with respect to
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity determinations and class
actions. The Federal Judicial Center, working with judges and lawyers,
has developed initial discovery protocols for employment cases, which
only apply to cases involving certain types of employment actions. This

&

294. For a discussion of structural issues in the summary judgment context, see Issacharoff
Loewenstein, supranote 139, at 74.
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has been shown to reduce motion practice in such cases, but not to
change the timing of resolution. 295 No one has attempted to evaluate
whether it alters the probability of correct application of the law to the
facts.
Some districts have initiated pilot programs to set the sequence
of proceedings for other types of cases, sometimes very specific types of
lawsuits involving repeat players. For example, the Southern District
of New York created a set of procedures for civil rights cases brought
under § 1983 only against the City of New York. 2 9 6 That protocol had
some strange provisions, such as requiring the plaintiff to make a
settlement demand within six weeks after the defendant's answer,
based, one imagines, on initial disclosures which were due (under the
plan) within twenty-one days after the defendant's answer. 297 My
interviews with plaintiff-side lawyers indicate that most of them opted
out of this plan because the initial disclosures were inadequate in all
but the most routine cases and because the plan focused too much on
encouraging settlement in cases where the plaintiffs were seeking
public vindication. This evidence is anecdotal; to date no formal study
of this plan has been conducted. The drive to create substance-specific
procedures that encourage settlement in civil rights cases seems strong
among judges-whether or not this is what parties want. The same
court has a mandatory mediation requirement for employment
discrimination cases. 298 Regimes that favor settlement have the benefit
of reducing judicial workload, but do not always promote social welfare.
In other areas of the procedural law, such as standing doctrine,
substance-specific approaches do not seem to adequately explain the
disintegration of the textbook sequence of motions. The pathway
remains open, however, even in doctrinal areas that cannot be
addressed through district court level protocols. For example, the
Supreme Court could adopt a substance-specific approach in standing
cases, requiring the injury-in-fact test to apply only in cases involving
administrative law and utilizing a cause of action test for other areas of
the law. This will present a line-drawing challenge, but it can be done
in a pragmatic way.
295. EMERY G. LEE III & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT
REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION

1 (2015).
296. See Plan for Certain § 1983 Cases Against the City of New York, U.S. DISTRICT CT. S.
DISTRICT

N.Y.,

http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/1983%20Revised%20Plan%20and

%20Exhibits.6.10.14.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S7NL-V9ZJ].
297. Id. IT 4, 7.
298. In re: Cases Assigned to Mediation by Automatic Referral, S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011,
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/StandingOrderADR_01032011.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC6ZYH9S].
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Whether protocols aimed at creating a special sequence for
specific types of cases will promote the right balance between accuracy,
speed, and costs depends on the protocol. The whole point of substancespecific procedure is that one size does not fit all. In addition, the
protocol may be resisted if it is trying to achieve results that are at odds
with the parties' preferences. For example, in the § 1983 protocol in the
Southern District of New York, judicial preferences for settlement were
inconsistent with plaintiff preferences for vindication. In that case, it is
also possible that the nature of the initial disclosures was such that the
plaintiffs did not believe that the procedures sufficiently assured
accuracy.
The creation of substance-specific protocols at the district court
level is also consistent with the trend toward devolution to local rules.
This creates infinite possibilities for variety and experimentation
among district courts and individual judges. The question raised by this
phenomenon, like that of bespoke procedure but on a smaller scale, is
whether the most effective process for making procedural rules is at the
national, local, or judge level. Should reform be top-down or bottom-up?
There are benefits to each approach. Ideally, experimentation in
procedural regimes would be undertaken with the intent to study their
effect and decide whether to scale up implementation, rather than
under pressure to solve local problems in the manner best suited to
serve the immediate interests of individual judges of the trial court.
That said, judges facing localized and repetitive problems in managing
cases need to have ways to solve those problems. A coordinated attempt
to consult with the bar and judges to develop solutions is a good
beginning.
Some scholars have suggested that the procedural rules ought to
be adjusted depending on the harmfulness of the act in question. 2 99 A
substance-specific procedure would by definition match the substantive
law, making some types of cases easier to pursue than others. This, in
turn, requires normative judgments about what acts are harmful, how
to measure that harm, and how to calibrate the procedure to the
perceived harmfulness of the act. Such determinations are very difficult
to make, as oftentimes people litigating (as well as judges) have
multiple goals and varying perceptions, indeed profound disagreement,
about the harmfulness of the act in question. That difficulty is
illustrated in the recent discovery amendments, which require that
discovery be calibrated to the value of the case, but then proceed to
include so many definitions of value as to leave the limitation entirely
299. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 1190 (questioning whether tailoring procedural rules to the
particular case types would best address "deterrence, chilling, and system costs").
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to the discretion of the individual judge.30 0 This approach limits the
ability of the appeals courts to police the lower courts.
The reason for this problem is that people disagree about the
purpose of litigation. For example, in civil rights cases, publicity,
vindication, and deterrence may be more important to the plaintiff than
money. The monetary value of the case may be very low, but the value
of the right may be high by other measures. The same may also be true
in some traditional private law cases, especially personal injury tort
cases where deterrence is an important goal. Some scholars think that
the difficulty of political agreement on the relative value of rights and
of procedural protections for those rights is the reason that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are so general and devolve so much power to
judicial discretion. As Robert Bone explains: "It is much easier for
rulemakers to compromise on a general rule that leaves the
controversial issues to the discretion of the trial judge than to resolve
the disagreement at the level of drafting the general rule itself."3 0 1
A case-by-case determination of the structure of procedure gives
tremendous power to individual judges to determine litigants' ability to
vindicate their rights. 302 This fact raises a separation-of-powers issue.
If the legislature creates a substantive right that the judge does not
approve of, that judge should not be able to subvert that right by
imposing greater procedural barriers to prevent its enforcement. 303
Furthermore, it is hard to know where to draw the line. If a local rule

300. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (limiting the scope of discovery). The Advisory Committee Note
to the 2015 Amendment explains:
It also is important to repeat the caution that the monetary stakes are only one factor,
to be balanced against other factors. The 1983 Committee Note recognized "the
significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or
institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres,
such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance

far beyond the monetary amount involved." Many other substantive areas also may
involve litigation that seeks relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but
that seeks to vindicate vitally important personal or public values.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
301. Bone, supra note 239, at 1974-75.
302. See Martha Minow, Politics and Procedure, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE

CRITIQUE 79 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (examining various characterizations of procedure
and how procedure influences the court and thus the outcome of the case); Gideon Parchomovsky
& Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1341-59 (2012)
(discussing unequal distribution of "litigation costs"). Even the rules regarding service of process
can result in a meritorious case being lost. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-64 (1965)
(holding that service of process in a diversity action must be made according to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, rather than the state rule, and thus reversing summary judgment for the
respondent claiming improper service under state law).

303. But see Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013) (stating that
"the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute
the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy").
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creates special procedures for certain types of cases, and these
procedures alter the ability of individuals to enforce their rights relative
to the baseline of the textbook order, the fact that this alteration is
district wide rather than individual does not diminish the impact of the
procedural change. Indeed, at any level (individual judge, district,
circuit, or national) if the calibration of rules to rights is not explicit,
and is instead hidden under the rubric of pure procedural changes, this
is cause for concern because it hides substantive choices that ought to
be justified and open to contestation. 304
It should be evident by now that the procedural law is not an
invisible and reliable baseline for effectuating rights, a blank canvas
against which legislatures and courts can create substantive law. It
would be useful to know what legislators know and expect when they
legislate rights and what design of the procedural law would meet these
expectations. There is reason to suspect that that the individuals who
draft legislation are not familiar with the technical workings of the
procedural law. 3 0 5 They may be familiar with high-profile procedural
rules, such as the class action rule, for example, but even so may not
always think of the effects of such rules when passing specific
legislation. 3 06
Another challenge to substance-specific procedure is the
administrability problem created by departures from the interrelated
scheme of the Federal Rules. We saw in Part II how the disintegration
of the textbook order has affected rules that seem unrelated to the
judicial decision on a particular procedural issue, and as a result the
rules are uncoordinated and lack coherence. Substantive rulemaking
would require thinking through how changes to any single rule affect
all other interrelated rules, resulting in a separate rule scheme for each
cause of action. As Paul Carrington has explained, "After commencing
down a trail to substantive variations in rules, Congress would find it
hard to stop short of complete differentiation that would seriously

304. See Jenny S. Martinez, Processand Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV.

1013, 1092 (2008) ("Procedure cannot provide a total escape from hard substantive choices; when
the main benefit of procedure is that it hides those substantive choices, we ought to be concerned.").
305. Congressional staffers often do not understand the canons of statutory construction. See
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 260, at 902 (indicating that drafters are familiar with and use
certain canons such as Chevron, but there are others that drafters knowingly reject or of which
they are unaware). Gluck and Bressman's work indicates that proceduralists would likely be
surprised by what congressional staffers do and do not know about the rules.
306. But see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 2-3 (2009) (introducing the argument that legislators

are not aware of the effect of the class action rule on rights enforcement and that the result is an
accountability problem). For a critique of this argument see Alexandra D. Lahav, Are Class Actions
Unconstitutional?,109 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1001-02 (2011), which asserts that legislators are aware
of the class action rule's effect on individual rights and substantive law.
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complicate federal court practice in the manner that the common law
procedure did."3 0 7 Substance-specific procedure is not impossible, but
requires significant investment and thoughtfulness.
Embedded into the structure of the rules is one last challenge:
the permissive joinder rules allow litigants to bring cases with multiple
claims in one lawsuit, making it difficult to decide which rules regime
should apply. The common law pleading regime allowed only a single
writ for this reason. For example, suppose that a litigant brought a
lawsuit which included both employment discrimination and breach of
contract claims-which procedural regime should apply, the one
governing contracts or the one governing employment discrimination?
Would a court need to determine whether one type of claim dominated
the other and how would this determination be made? Or would the two
claims proceed on parallel tracks? Perhaps the judge would apply a
bespoke order. Whatever the standard applied, these questions would
likely be litigated. Such satellite litigation about the procedural regime
to be applied would increase costs.
In sum, the main benefit of a substance-specific procedural
design is that it can provide a more perfect fit between the value of the
right to be vindicated and the procedural law. The costs are that it
would require a substantial revision to the procedural law for each
subject area, would make resolution of multiple claims in one lawsuit
difficult, and may spur satellite litigation. The fact that such a regime
requires rulemakers to face the substantive effects of procedural rules
head on can be described as either a benefit or a cost, depending on one's
point of view.
CONCLUSION

The normative claim of this Article is that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ought to have a contestable procedural design. As a
descriptive matter, the major contribution of this Article has been to lay
out the decay of textbook procedure, a phenomenon that has not been
documented before, and to suggest some reasons for these
developments. Responding to the loss of an agreed upon procedural
design in the federal courts, I provide a framework for debating
procedural design going forward. Our system has migrated toward a
patchwork order with elements of both the bespoke and substancespecific procedural systems, yet without apparent consideration of
procedural design. Each of the procedural designs suggested here has
costs and benefits, many hinging on the predicted behavior of judges
307. Carrington, supra note 250, at 2113.
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and litigants. The challenge remains to find the right balance between
tailoring to the individual case and systemic justice, and to be explicit
about these choices so that they can be contested. In picking a
procedural design, judges should remember that "we must not lose
order itself in the attempt to make it good." 308

308. Fuller, supranote 5, at 657.

